BOOK I CH. XI § 27. 111

non vidit—mundo. Epicurean polemic: if each soul is a part of the divine soul, then (1) the separate existence of human souls must cause a laceration of the universal soul, (2) when the individual soul is conscious of pain, a part of divinity is in pain, (3) each soul must partake in the infinite knowledge of the universal soul, (4) it is impossible that an incorporeal soul could be united with a material world. For obj. (1) cf. § 24 dei membra ardentia: it is of course merely straining the metaphor of carperentur. Both this and the following obj. are based on the Epicurean assumption of perfect happiness as essential to divinity. On the Epicurean pessimism (quod plerisque contingeret) see §23n, Obj. (4) is inapplicable : the writers who attribute to P. the derivation of the human soul from the divine represent him as materializing both under the form of fire or aether.
distractione : Ba. adopts Ruhnken’s conjecture detractione referring to the separation of each soul from the universal soul; but the Ms reading may be defended as expressing the division of the universal soul among a number of human souls: animus detrahitur de deo, but deus distrahitur in animos.
§ 28. infixus properly of a solid; infusus, of a liquid.
Xenophanes. Krische 86—97. Elsewhere C. gives a more correct ac- count, cf. Ac. 1 118 Xen. unum esse omnia, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse deum, neque natum unquam et sempiternum conglobata figura; De Orat. 111 20 veteres ili (sc. Eleatae) omnia haec quae supra et subter, unum esse et Una vi atque una consensione naturae constricta esse dixerunt, &c. As to the infinity of the universe Arist. (Met. a. 986 b.) distinctly tells us that while Parmenides made the One remepacpévov, regarding it from the ideal side, and Melissus, regarding it from the material side, made it dmetpov, Xeno- phanes ov6év Stecahjnucev add’ eis Tov ddov ovpavoy amoBréWas Td év eivat dno tov Oeov. In the Aristotelian treatise, M/elissus, however (c. 4) it is argued that, if God is spherical (as X. affirmed) he must also be finite, opaposidy dvra avaykn mépas exe, whence later writers attributed this doctrine to him, e.g. Galen, Hist. Ph, 11 24 elvar mavra €v, kai todTo Umdp- xew Oedv memepacpévoy, Aoytkov, duetaBAnrov. On the other hand we read (Meliss. 2) that X. supposed the earth to extend downwards and the air upwards to infinity which may have given rise to the representation of his doctrine here followed by C. or this may have arisen, as Krische thinks (p. 91) from the confusion between the infinite in time (déScov) and the infinite in space (dmepoy) cf. Meliss, 1, and Zeller 11494. One might have expected to find some reference here to the noble protest made by Xen. against the debasing ideas connected with the popular religion, but the Epicureans in their allusions to other philosophers only thought of exalting their own master, and Xen.’s ridicule of anthropomorphism would make his writings especially distasteful to them. The fragments of Xen. were collected and explained by Karsten, 1830.
qui mente—voluit esse. Sch. (in loc. and Neue Jahrb. 1875 p. 685 foll.) takes praeterea—infinitum as a separate clause, translating ‘he held
112 BOOK I CH. XI § 28.
the rational universe to be not only infinite but God’; he allows however that he knows no example of praeterea quod used in the sense of praeter quam quod ; and if C. had meant this, why should he not have said simply et inf. et d.? I think too the context shows that ¢nfinitum must be taken as belonging to the subject ; Vell. objects not to 76 way being called drecpov, but to ro amewpov being called @eoy. And the same appears from the quotation in Minucius c. 19 Yen. notum est omne infinitum cum mente deum tradere. I believe that C. is translating some such original as 76 zap, Aoyixov dv Kal ametpov, Oeov etvat, and that he has here turned a quality into an independent substance, as was done above in the case of Thales, and also of Democritus (§ 29). Then praeterea quod esset (or perhaps praeterea alone) seems to me a gloss intended to soften the apparent contradiction in the idea of 76 way in which mind is not included. For omne=ro6 ray, cf. Div. 1. 103 quod in natura rerum omne esse dicimus, id infinitum esse. [I am inclined to think that X. used a@ze:pov in the sense of ‘indefinite’, and that the true reading here is propterea, not praeterea; X.’s God was God just because he had no definite organs (otAos opa &c.) like the anthropo- morphic Gods. J. 8. R.]
de ipsa—potest esse. Epicurean polemic: as regards the divinity of mind, Xen. is open to the same criticism as Thales and Anaxagoras (for why did he combine mind with infinity? and if it is unbodied mind, how can that feel?): as regards the divinity of the infinite, he is even more to blame, for vacancy is the only infinite, and in this there can be no feeling and no connexion with any thing external (such as mind) since it includes all things in itself. There seems no ground for Kr.’s supposition that conjunctum is used in the Lucretian sense (1 450) of a property ; for void, no less than the atoms, has conjuncta in this sense; nor again for Hirzel’s view that it is synonymous with continens in § 26. The easiest reference is plainly to the preceding mente adjuncta, and if so, it is an additional argu- ment against the genuineness of the weak addition praeterea quod esset, which would just serve to turn the edge of the criticism.
Parmenides: see Krische 97—116. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (Amsterdam 1835) and Mullach Frag. Piil. vol. 1 109—130. As X.’s theology was found in his account of ro oy», any rational investigation of the development of theological thought would have shown us in what respects his disciple’s view of the ro ov differed from his; but the Epicurean critic has no eye for anything but names, and finding the word @eds occurring frequently in P.’s popu- lar account of the phenomenal world, he confines his attention to this, regardless of the fact that, whether named or not, the idea of divinity is as much involved in P.’s higher philosophy as in that of many of his predecessors, and also forgetting that the cosmical system of Par- menides is in the main taken from Pythagoras and should have been criticized under his name. The doctrine here alluded to is given by Stob. Lcl. 1c. 22, I. orepavas eivar mepimemdeypévas émaddndovs, THY pev EK TOD