BOOK I CH. XI § 26. 109

should propose to insert in eo after omnino and to change quo into quod}, translating ‘nor did he see that feeling of any kind is impossible unless the feeling subject is of such a nature as to be capable of tangible impres- sion’, lit. ‘nor feeling at all in that which did not feel from its very nature receiving a shock’. Jn eo—sentiret is a general expression for that which is immaterial. [I understand the ordinary reading as follows, ‘nor can there be sensation at all, without the sentient creature becoming sen- tient by an impulse from without’, taking quo non=quin, and ipsa as merely emphasizing the subject. J. 8S. R.]
deinde—videtur : ‘in the next place, if he intended the infinite mind to be a separate living creature (a (Gov dpOaprov like the Gods of Epicurus, as opposed to an element pervading all matter) it must have an inner and an outer part: but mind itself is the innermost seat of life, so it must be clothed with a body. Since he objects to this, we are left with nothing but bare unclothed mind, unprovided with any organs of sense, a notion which it passes the force of our understanding to grasp’. Epicurus speaks to the same effect in Diog. L. x 66 (of disembodied soul) od yap oid re voeiv adtiy aicbavopervny pn ev ToUT@ TO GvoTHpate Kal Tais KwHnoeot TavTaLs xpopemv. That ‘animal’ is a name for the compound of soul and body appears from Arist. Pol. I 5 1d (Gov mpdrov cuvéatnkev éx Wuyis Kal owparos, and C, Tim. 4 intellegentiam in animo, animum inclusit in corpore ... quam ob causam non est cunctandum profitert hune mundum animal esse. In Lucr. m1 136—144 we read that mens or animus has its seat in the breast, while the rest of the soul (anima) is disseminated throughout the body; in 230 foll. one ingredient in mens is said to be a nameless element, not found in the anima, nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque | nec magis hac infra quicquam est in corpore nostro | atque anima est animae proporro totius ipsa | 273—275
ex quo nominetur : ‘to justify the name’. [Cf. mr 36 animus ex quo animal dicitur, Tuse. 1 21 if animus non est, then frustra animalia appel- lantur. J.S. R.]
§ 27. quoniam: properly gives the reason for aperta mens, but the contemptuous brevity with which the Epicurean argument is stated has compressed two clauses into one, and guoniam placet now serves as a protasis to the principal sentence.
qua sentire possit : Bouhier adopted this reading from the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118, in place of the quae of the mss.
fugere—notionem : ‘to transcend the comprehension of man’s under- standing’. For fug. ef. Tuse. 1 50 tanta est animi tenuitas ut fugiat aciem, Leg. Man. 28 hujus viri scientiam fugere. Vim et notionem is a sort of hendiadys for vim noscendi.
Alcmaeo: a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Krische pp. 68— 78). He held the soul dOdvatov eivar dia 1d éotxévac Trois aOavdrows, TodTo
1 The two words are constantly confused in the mss, see C. F, W. Miiller Fleck. Jahrb. 1864.
110 BOOK 1 Ou, xt S27,
& vmdpyxew avr7 ws del Kivoupery’ KweicOat yap kal ra Ocia mavra cuveyas del, ceAnvny, nAtov, TOs doTepas Kal Tov ovpavoy ddov, Arist. An. I 2.17. As usual the criticism consists merely in the assertion of the irreconcileability of the doctrine criticized with the Epicurean assumptions, Epic. held that the stars and the soul were compounded of atoms and therefore dissoluble ; Alc. held that they possessed the property of self-movement and were therefore immortal.
nam Pythagoras. On the elliptical use of nam in passing from one point to another, like autem, quid, gam, see Nigels. Styl. § 196, Draeg. § 348 4, Mayor on Juy, x 204. Here the thought omitted is ‘ why speak of his friend P. for he is guilty of even greater absurdities’, Cf. nam Par- menides just below; nam Abderites § 63, in a list of irreligious philosophers ; nam Phaedro § 93, in a list of Epicureans; nam justitia...nam fortis in recounting the virtues 111 38; nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? in giving a list of his writings Div. 11 3; nam de angue, nam Dionysi equus, nam quod stellas aureas in a list of portents Div. 11 65, 67, 68, nam Strato Ac. 1 34. I think it is a mistake in Shilleto (Thue. 1 25) to endeavour to explain this use both in nam and yap, by referring to a supposed earlier meaning of the two words—nam, he says, is nearly equivalent to the German némlich— for, whatever may have been the original meaning, the word is coloured by its preponderating use, which gives it its special sprightliness as a particle of transition.
animum—carperentur. See Krische 78—86, Zeller 1 3854 foll. 412 foll. Heinze Logos 179. This doctrine is also ascribed to P. in Senect. 78 Pythagoras Pythagoreique numquam dubitarunt quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus, and in Sext. Emp. Math. 1x 127 év vmdp- xew mvedpa TO Oia TavTds Tod Koopov SijKov Wuxis tTporoy, Diog. L. vit 25 dvOpdrots eivar mpos Ocovs ovyyéveray kata Td peréxe avOpwrov Oeppod... eivat b€ THY Wuxyv aroorazua aidépos Kat Tod Oeppod cai Tod Yuypod... dOavatév 7 eivat adrny éereidnmep Kat TO ad’ ov dréomacrat dbavarov éorw. This is the exoteric side of the Pythagorean doctrine modified, as is probable, by some Stoic commentator who wished to claim the authority of P. for his own pantheistic system. The statement in the Ac. 1 118 Pythagoret ex numeris et mathematicorum wnitits proficisci volunt omnia is more in accordance with Arist. (Met. 1 5, xiv 3, &c.), who also gives a different account of the Pythagorean psychology (An. 14 compared with Plato Phaedo 85), ‘some call the soul a harmony, some say that it con- sists of the motes in the sunbeam or the cause of their movement’. On the religious ideas of the Pythagoreans see Zeller 1 418 foll. and cf. C. Leg. 11 26 bene dictum est ab co tum maxime et pictatem et religionem versari in animis cum rebus divinis operam daremus. ‘The most complete account of the Pythagoreans is to be found in Chaignet Pythagore et la philosophie pytha- goricienne, 1873.
intentum per: ‘pervading’, lit. ‘stretched through, like the warp in the fabric’,