C. goes more into particulars with regard to the opotopepeia, A. materiam

infintam sed ex ea particulas, similes inter se, minutas, eas primum con- fusas, postea in ordinem adductas esse a mente divina cf. Zeller 14 880,
discriptionem. Biicheler has shown (RA. Mus. n.s, x11 600) that the word formerly written descriptio should be written discr. whenever it implies distribution or arrangement, as in Senect. 59 where it is equivalent to the Scaraooeww of Xenophon.
in quo—sentiret. Epicurean objection: ‘activity and feeling, i.e. rational life, cannot have its seat in what is infinite, nor is feeling possible without’ impact’, This is again an appeal to the Epicurean assumption, that rationality is only possible in a being of human form. The voids of An. is described by himself in the words dmetpov éotiv kat avtoxpatés kat péwixrae ovdevt xpruati, dAda povvos avros ef EéwvTod €oTw...€0T. yap Aerroratov mavteyv xpnudtev Kal kaOapsratoy Kal yvepuny ye mepl mavtos macav ioxer Kal loyver peyroroy (C.’s vt ac ratione) Kal dxoia euedde Eoeo- Oat, kai Oxoia Hy, Kal OKoia viv ort, Kal bkola €oTal, mavTa SueKdopNTE vdos, Simpl. in Phys. f. 336. The last sentence reminds one of the fragment of Philodemus p. 66, where we read that ‘mind was, and is, and will be hereafter’, and that ‘it rules and governs all things and superintends their infinite combinations’. Though it is doubtful whether An. himself ex- pressly deified Nous, later writers were certainly justified in regarding it as divine (Sext. Emp. Math, 1x 6, Cic. Ac. l.c.) as is practically done by Vell. here. On the other hand he is said to have been banished from Athens for impiety in asserting that the sun was a red-hot stone (Schau- bach Anaz. frag. pp. 38—52, 139—142), since as Plutarch says (Pericles 23) they could not endure the substitution of irrational causes and blind forces in place of the old divinities.
in quo non vidit : ‘in making which statement he failed to observe’, So non sensit, non vidit, of Alemaeon and Pythagoras below.
motum sensui junctum: this is the distinctive property of mens (sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus, Lucr. 111 272). Thus Aristotle says (Anim. I 2) that the éuyvyov is thought to be distinguished from awvyov by two marks kwnget cal t6 aicOaver Oat
continentem : here intrans. but trans. in § 39. It may be taken with sensui, repeating the notion of junctum, as we find mari aer continens 11 117, cf. Ac. 1 105, Fat. 44 where it stands with proximus ; or we may take it absolutely in the sense of ‘continuous’ ‘without break’ whether in
108 BOOK I CH. XI § 26.
time or space. Taking it in the latter sense it will refer to the one all- pervading movement initiated by the Anaxagorean Nous, in contrast to the innumerable disconnected movements of the Epicurean atoms. Hirzel compares Cleomedes Met. 11 dreipov yap ovdevos pvow eivac Suvatov’ det yap xatraxpartety tiv pioww ovtwos eotw.
in infinito : ‘in an infinite subject’, a more general expression for the preceding mens injfinita, not, as Hirzel, p. 94, with a distinct reference to the universe considered apart from mind, though when the unintelligible mens infinita had been changed into the abstract ¢nfinitum, it could not fail to suggest to an Epicurean the thought of the infinite void as its only legitimate interpretation. To Anaxagoras the infinity of mind meant its unlimited wisdom and power : here it is understood of a mind not bounded in space or inclosed in body, but the Epicureans recognized no immaterial existence except rd xevov, which can neither affect nor be affected, but merely makes movement possible to bodies, da@ oi éyortes dowparov eivac THY Wuyiy pataatovory. ovbev yap av edvvaro movetv ovte macxeww (Epic. in Diog. L. x 67). Cf. below on Pythagoras § 28, Plato § 30, Aristotle § 33.
neque sensum—sentiret. The reading of the Mss is omnino quo translated by Kiihner ‘a sensation which the nature of the infinite mind would experience without being itself moved by it’, governing quo by pulsa. Sch. makes natura pulsa Abl. Abs. (rightly, as I think) and governs quo by sentiret: he proposes also to substitute zpsius for cpsa. The meaning then would be ‘a feeling with which it would feel without its own nature being moved’, Heind. inserts tota from the quotation in August. Ep. 118 and takes sensus of the infinitus alle sensus mentis divinae which penetrates all things, a quo sensu st pelleretur natura tota ipsa sensum acciperet. Hirzel p. 95 agrees with him in making ipsa natura pulsa Nom. and opposing it to the mens infinita. ‘It is denied’, he says ‘dass es tiberhaupt eine andere Empfindung als die in der Natur selber lebendig ist, in der Welt giibe’; and to prove that natura may be thus opposed to the divine Mind, he quotes § 53 natura effectum esse mundum. Comparing the objection to the pantheism of Pythagoras § 28, cur autem quicquam igno- raret animus hominis si esset deus ?, he considers that the present objection is equivalent to saying dass jedes Wesen nur ein einziges Empfinden, nicht neben dem einigen noch ein fremdes, das géttliche, in sich haben kénne. None of these explanations seem to me satisfactory: Sch. and Ku. give a very harsh construction, and the latter’s quo (sc. sensw) pulsa makes sensus the cause, not the result of impact. Hirz. agrees with Sch. in retaining the awkward construction quo (sensw) sentiret, and his explanation seems to make the Epicureans attribute feeling to inanimate nature, a conception as abhorrent to them as that of a soul of the universe. Heind. gives a good sense, ‘if there were an all-pervading mind then every thing would be sensitive’, but if that were what C. meant, he would hardly have expressed it so obscurely. I think a clause is wanted to balance in infinito, and