C. himself, and that the author whom he follows could have said nothing of

‘mind making all things out of water’; but only described in general terms the combination of two principles. The use of the plural dz after the sing. deus may be intended to heighten the supposed absurdity of the dogma, or it may be an allusion to the words already quoted mavra mAnpyn Oeov. Another way of dealing with the sentence is to regard st ipse—tempore as an example of repeated protasis: so Heind., Moser, Krische, Kiihner. As the repetition of the protasis would be only admissible here, if the 2nd protasis were really a restatement of the 1st, (see Mady. #%. 17, who calls this passage graviter mendosus) we should then have to take mens as ex- plaining di, and sine corpore as explaining sine sensu, interpreting as fol- lows, ‘if the gods, i.e. pure mind, can exist apart from feeling, i.e. from a human body (we must take corpus thus if it is essential to sensation, for body in the wide sense, including the elements, is sine sensu ; see below on Empedocles and Diogenes) why did he add mind to water?’ But it is plain that there is no logical connexion here between protasis and apodosis. Nor is anything gained by reading motu for mente with Moser, Krische, Kiihner. Kr. defends the change by a reference to the polemic against Anaxagoras just below, and to a passage in Philodemus p. 88 1. 80, where allusion is made to philosophers who deify rods od& emixunOjvar Suvapévovs }} Tovs evapyas dvaicOnrovs ; and explains as follows ‘if it is possible for gods to exist without feeling or movement, i.e. as pure incorporeal spirit, why did he link them to water, if mind can exist apart from body’, an in- terpretation which is open to the same charge as Heindorf’s.
Lastly it may be worth mention that three of the best Mss read sie for si, on which Davies followed by Allen founds the text, ste di possunt esse sine sensu. At mentem cur aquae, &c., and similarly Becker Comm. Crit. p. 14 sie di—sensu! sed mentem—corpore? Krische points out the ob- jections to this. See for a discussion of the whole passage his Z'heol. Lehren pp. 34—42, and Sch. Opuse. 11 359. Other suggestions are given by Fortsch Quaest. Tull. 5—8, and Stamm De libr. de NV. D. interpola- tionibus 16—21.
Anaximander. Sce Krische pp. 42—52. C. gives the ordinary ac- count of his doctrine in Ac. 11 118 infinitatem naturae dixit esse a qua cuncta gignerentur. If there were any consistency in the Epicurean polemic, A’s first principle 76 dzetpoy (like the Water of Thales) should
1 Though the latter held at the same time the eternity, not of unformed
chaotic matter, as Plato, but of the universe itself, still he constantly affirms that 70 Kwoty (mind) is pice: mporepov Tov Kivouuevou (body).