BOOK I cH. xX § 25. 103

(erd mas’ TO O€ Norby AOporcpa Tapackevacay THY airiay TavTnv pereihnhe kat avTO ToLovToV cuMTepatos map ekeivns, ov pévToL TavT@Y oY ekeivn Kéxtnta. Ovo dmadAayelons Ths Wuxns ovK exet THY alcOnow" ov yap ado ev é€aut@ tavtny exéxtnto thy Sdvayuy «.t.A. from which it appears that the fine atoms which form the soul and especially its purest part, the mind or reason, which has its seat in the heart, (l.c. 66) are the true source of sensation, but that they can only act when confined within the body, on leaving which they are immediately dissipated and no longer exist as soul. Body by itself, i.e. the compound of grosser atoms known to us by the name of body, is incapable of sensation, but when united with the finer atoms of mind, it becomes sensitive to a certain degree. On the general subject of the relation of soul and body, cf. Lucr. m1 esp. 230—287, where he shows that either by itself is alike incapable of sensation. Taking this as our clue, I think the only satisfactory way of getting over the difficulties of the sentence is to suppose that the apodosis to the 2nd protasis has been lost. This was the view of Lambinus who inserted the clause cur aguam mentt before adjunxit, changing et mente into mentem. Most of the modern editors have followed in the same track. The text which I have given is that of Baiter except that I go with Lamb. in omitting e¢ mente, which seems to have arisen simply from a misreading of the abbreviated mente: when this was once taken as an Abl. it would naturally be joined with the preceding sensu by an et. Sch.’s reading runs the first question too much into the second; the first cur must certainly be followed by an adjunait: and it is also easier to account for the loss of the 2nd clause, if its end was an echo of the Ist. How then will the argument stand? The dogma attacked is, in its most general form, that the first principle is divinely animated water ; to which it is objected that we have here an unnecessary combination of two principles : ‘if divinity is possible without feeling, why add mind?) Why may not simple water stand for the first principle? On the other hand, if mind is capable of existing alone, unconnected with any body, why tie it down to water? It is difficult to deal with the argument from the ambiguity in the use of the word ‘god’. If by ‘god’ is meant the first principle, then the Epicureans would have allowed that this may exist sine sensu. In their view senseless atoms are the first principles, and they could have no a priorz objection to senseless water holding the same office. On the other hand, if the name ‘god’ implies personality, then it is plain that the first principle of Thales was not a god. Divine persons such as those whom the popular religion recognized were as subordinate in his philosophy as they were in that of Epicurus, but they are certainly not more opposed to the former system than to the latter. The point of the objection seems to be that a dynamical principle, like that of the older Tonic philosophers, as opposed to the mechanical principles of Democritus, is an irrational blending of two contrary principles, the materialistic and the idealistic. In this objection Plato and Aristotle would concur, both holding that the universe took shape under the influence of eternal; self-
104 BOOK I CH. X § 25,
existent, incorporeal mind?, whereas Epicurus of course preferred the other alternative and proclaimed the priority of matter. But the form given to the doctrine of Thales in the preceding sentence would not be inconsistent with a pure idealism; indeed Minucius c. 19, quoting this passage says that T. copied the Mosaic account of the Spirit of God moving upon the face of the waters. We may therefore conclude that this form is due to