BOOK I CH.I § 1. 67

causa principium, B? causa et principium, C? causam id est principium ; lastly all but one appear to have scientiam for inscientiam. Wyttenbach followed by Heindorf and Creuzer omits the clause zd est principium philosophiae, which is usually explained by a reference to Arist. Met. 1 210 dia ro Hevyew thy ayvoiay epirrooddyaar, ‘the great discrepancy of opinions is an evidence that the cause or starting-point of philosophy was the painful consciousness of ignorance, and that the Academics are justified in refusing to make any affirmation on points where certainty is unattainable’. (See Krische p. 7.) But this explanation is unsatis- factory on several grounds ; (1) there is no reason for making any refer- ence to the origin of philosophy, (2) the present discrepancy of opinions is no argument as to what may have been the origin of philosophy, (3) the origin of philosophy is in no way connected with the Academic principle (itself the result of a long history of philosophy) that man must be content with probability, (4) bare ignorance is very far from being the cause of philosophy, and it would be an altogether wrong use of words to make inscientia=ro pevyew tHv ayvoray, (5) principium philosophandi would have been a more appropriate expression for the supposed sense. Nor is it much more satisfactory to interpret the clause as affirming that the Socratic confession of ignorance is the starting-point of philosophy in the individual (cf. Ac.1 44). If we retain the ordinary reading, I think it is best to take it as giving the sceptical view, ‘the cause and origin of this whole windbag of philosophy is ignorance’, cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 1x 29 rd wodvrpomoy tis dropacews (mapa trois Soypatikois ditocdpos) ty ayvwciav tod mavTos ddnbots emoppayitera. But though such language may have been used by Hortensius and others (7%. I 2), it is hardly conceivable that C. should have adopted it as his own. I should prefer therefore to follow Ursinus (if one only knew what his ms. was!) or Heind., whose reading gives an excellent sense though somewhat clumsily expressed : ‘the discrepancy of opinions proves that they all sprang from ignorance, and that the Aca- demics are right in refusing to make any positive assertion’. The interpo- lation of the clause omitted by him would be easily accounted for by the supposition that id principium philosophiae was a gloss on the words Academicos assensionem cohibuisse, meaning that this was the leading prin- ciple of their philosophy. The variety of opinions was the 10th of the common-places used by the Sceptics to prove that knowledge was un- attainable, see Sext. Emp. Hyp. 1 14 145. Baiter, in order to keep the sint of the majority of Mss, inserts ewm, reading debent for debeat in apodosi, but this is awkward after ewm multae ; and it is also more natural to introduce the discrepancy of opinion as a distinct statement to be proved by what follows, velut in hac quaestione, rather than to refer to it as already known. Orelli follows Ernesti in inserting id before magno, an
1 *Magna est suspicio eum virum quae sibi pee Jinxisse’, Moser, Praef. ad Tusc. p.xv11; ‘Ursini codices, qui ubicunqué haeserat praesto erant, commemo- rare nihil attinet’, Mady. Praef. ad Fin. p. xxx1x.
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alteration which Sch. also (Opuse. 11 294) thinks required unless debeant is substituted for debeat of Mss. Might not the subject of the verb be supplied from the preceding clause (tam varias esse)? [‘I take the words causam—inscientiam to mean that the true theory of philosophy is that which denies émornun, in other words that which the Academics oppose to the Stoics’. J. 8. R.]
rebus incertis: cf. August. Ac. 1 11 erret enim (sapiens) necesse est, quod sapienti nefas est, si assentiatur rebus incertis. Et omnia incerta non dicebant solum, verum etiam copiosissimis rationibus affirmabant (Aca- demic). [Some distinguished between the strictly aénAa and the mava, Cic. Ac. 11 32. J.S. R.]
assensionem: quam Graect ovyxatabeow vocant Cic. Ac. 1 12 27. Carneades is said ex animis extraxisse assensionem ut feram et tmmanem beluam. Ac. 11 108.
ass. cohib. the éemoyy of the Sceptics and Academies, Ac. 11 59.
turpius: most mss have fort/us from which Manutius conjectured foedius, but Sch. (Opuse, 111 358) points out that this word, which implies something shocking or disgusting, would be far too strong for the occasion. Turpius is used in similar passages, e.g. 1 70 hoc dicere turpius est, Ac. 1 45 (Arcesilas negabat) quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptiont udsensionem approbationemque praecurrere, Divin. i 7 omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiendo errorque turpis est.
perceptum et cognitum :-the two verbs serve to translate the single Gr. v. caradapBaveoba. See Reid on Acad. 1 34 percipi atque compre- hendi, C. proceeds as usual on the principle described Fin. 111 14 erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus’, The Academica are occupied with the discussion whether our knowledge amounts to a perc. et cog., i.e. whether we can arrive at real certainty both by sense-impressions and by reasoning, as the Stoics affirmed, or must be satisfied with a greater or less amount of probability, according to the Academic view. The word explorate has a half-technical force: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? is the exclamation of the Academic (Ac. 11 129).
[sine ulla dubitatione: Aug. C. D. vi 2 ridicules C. for speaking of Varro as sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo. J. 8. R.]
§ 2. velut: ‘for instance’, introducing an example of a general prin- ciple already stated, cf. § 101 velut ibes, 1 124 veluti crocodili.
quod—trahimur : relative clause explained by the following deos esse.
quo=ad quod, The arguinent from universal consent is urged § 43, 11 12, Leg. 1 24, Tuse. 1 30. “%
plerique deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse Diagoras: ‘While the majority have maintained the existence of the Gods, Prot. (see Introduction) doubted, &c.’ On the asyndeton see § 20 cujus principium ; on Diag. and Theod. § 63. All three names are referred to by Min. F. c. 8.