BOOK I CH. XXXIx § 108. 215

inculcatis : ‘you cram these images into our minds as well as into our eyes’, cf. Fat. 6 quid attinet inculcare fatum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur ? Cotta in his jaunty way treats this quite as a new idea, but it has been assumed throughout the discus- sion ; cf. § 105 ententa mens, ad cogitationem, adventum in animos, pellantur animi &. It is one of the many marks of haste which disfigure the book.
impunitas garriendi: ‘so little you care what you say’.
Ch. xxx1x § 109. quam licenter: ‘what extravagance it is!’ cf. § 65.
fluentium—videatur : cf. § 49, Lucr. Iv 228 nec mora nec requies inter- datur ulla fluendi, Epic. ap. Diog. L. X 48 petdos and tav copdtov ris emimoAns cuvexts cupBaivet.
visionum : here=imaginum the thing seen (as in Div. 11 120 animos externa et adventicia visione pulsari), in § 105 the process of seeing.
dicere non intellegere: for the omission of the subject cf. § 84 conjitert nescire.
quo modo aeternae: the omission of sunt makes the change of con- struction unusually harsh.
suppeditat : ‘there is an endless supply of atoms’.
inguit : ‘quotha’, this reading is better supported than znqguzs. Bentley, on Hor. Sat. 1 4. 79 (cited by Creuzer on WV. D. 1 100), compares the use of gnai, and says perpetua formula est, ubi aliquid ex adverso nobis objici et opponi fingimus, sive id ab uno seu pluribus, sive ab absente seu praesente Jiat, adding many exx.
num—sempiterna : ‘do you mean to say then that everything will be eternal for the same reason?’ The infinity of the atoms is given by Vell. 1. c. as an explanation of the continuous stream of images, and apparently as suggesting the eternity of the Being revealed to us in them; so Philod. p- 110 ‘the divine individuality (?é:orns) having its origin in the resem- blance of the images may exist in perfect blessedness for ever’. Sch. denies this, and says that the Epicurean argument for the eternity of the Gods is (1) the mporAnfis (2) icovopia. But the mpodnWis is simply the unconscious effect of experience, i.e. of the impression of the images on the mind, and icovopia is mentioned in § 50 as the ground of the infinite number, not of the infinite duration, of immortal beings. It is probable however, as stated in the note there, that C. has wrongly spoken of beings instead of forces, and we may therefore allow icovoyia to stand as one of the arguments. A third argument (denied by Sch.) was the fineness of the atoms of which the Gods were composed, see § 71 n.
aequilibritatem : cf. § 50; the word appears to be dm. Ney. though Vitruvius uses aequilibris.
isto modo—sint aliqui immortales: ‘according to that, since men are mortal, some would be immortal’, Scné¢ is the apodosis to a protasis contained in zsto modo=si hoc ita sit.
et quia sunt—sentio: ‘and since there are destructive forces, there are also (or reading sint with some of the best ss., ‘let there be also’)
216 BOOK I CH. XXXIx § 109.
conservative forces. By all means, but let the conservative forces be exerted on what is actually in existence. I don’t perceive that your Gods do exist. So Davies, Madv. Sch. Opuse. Iv p. 843; others take ea as subject of conservent (‘let the conservative forces be such as really exist themselves’) implying that the Epicureans identified these forces with their Gods ; whereas the Epicurean Gods were confessedly free from the toils of superintending the universe. Still this is not conclusive, as the disputants in C.’s dialogue are quite capable of forgetting or passing over any point which might be inconvenient. The reference is to the words of Vell. § 50 st quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.
§ 110. omnis tamen—oritur : ‘however (to leave the Gods and return to the question asked in § 107), how do you explain the origin of your object-pictures generally out of the atoms?’ effigies oritur is a loose expres- sion for efigiatus (or effictio) jit.
etiamsi essent, quae nulla sunt: cf. Div. 1171 ut sint auspicia, quae nulla sunt, V. D. 1 61, 65, 123.
Ch. xt. de beato. Cic. prefers to use the neut. adj. instead of his invention of § 95, so we find Tusc. v 45 ex bonis, quae sola honesta sunt, eficiendum est beatum, Fin. v 85 (virtutem) in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum.
sine virtute—vita : for the omission of the verb in these short clauses see § 68 n. That virtue is essential to happiness is asserted by Vell. § 48, and by Ep. himself in the 4th xupia dd€a, Diog. L. x 140, ovk éoriv nd€éws Cy dvev Tov ppovipws kal Kaos kal dixaiws. The Academic disputant in m1 § 38 endeavours to prove that we cannot ascribe to God any virtue known to us.
actuosa: but elsewhere C. recognizes the Aristotelian division of the moral and intellectual virtues (Part. Or. § 76) est igitur vis virtutis duplex: aut enim scientia cernitur virtus, aut actione. Nam quae prudentia...appel- latur, haec scientia pollet una: quae vero moderandis cupiditatibus regen- disque animt motibus laudatur, ejus est munus in agendo, and it is the former virtue only which belongs to divinity, according to Aristotle, 76 87 (avte Tou mpatrew adhatpoupevor, ére S€ waddov Tov Trovety, TL AeimeTaL TAY Oewpia; wore 7 Tov Oevd evépyera, paxapiotnte Suapepovea, Oewpyntixy ay ein, Li, XS,
et deus: Mr Roby proposes to read at (which might easily lose its vowel after actuosa, and change into ef) as it introduces a minor premiss in a quasi-syllogistic argument. But where one syllogism is subordinated to another (as in this passage virtus autem—igitur represents the minor premiss in the syllogism of which s¢ne virtute nullo modo is the major, and ne beatus quidem the conclusion) it is not uncommon to omit the signs of opposition between the propositions of the subordinate syllogism : thus, A, none are happy without virtue ; B, but virtue is active and your God inactive, therefore not virtuous ; C, therefore your god is not happy.
ne beatus quidem: ‘not happy either’ (wanting in happincss as well as in virtue), cf. § 72 n., and § 113.