BOOK I CH. XXXII § 89. 195

suit the context. What is wanted is a phrase to express strict logical procedure as opposed to a mere statement of belief, and I think this is better expressed by the Abl. than by Sch.’s argumenta (or summam) sententiae, see his Opusc. 111 289 and 328. Madv., it is true, denies the possibility of this reading, see his note on Fin. 1 30 Latine ‘rationem, argu- mentum concludere’ dicimur, etiam ‘aliquid concludere’ ut accusativus pro- nominis addatur; ‘ sententiam rem’ non magis ‘concludere’ dicimur quam ‘rem negare’ aut ‘veritatem ret’. But negative statements of this kind are to be received with very great suspicion even when made about the writer’s own language, and the correctness of the expression is, I think, shown by the citations in Miiller Adn. Cr. v, e.g. Ac. 132 itaque tradebatur omnis dia- lecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae, which Reid translates ‘speech drawn up in syllogistic form’; cf. too Div. 1 82 quam (divina- tionem) esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur, where we might surely have had quae sententia rat. concluditur. The phrase occurs in the more general sense of ‘rounding off’? in Brutus 34 ipsa natura circum- scriptione quadam verborum comprehendit concluditque sententiam, Orator 230 aptius explet concluditque sententias, so Quintil. senswm numeris con- cludere. |
Ch. xxx. beatos esse—hominis figura. This is an example of the composite or chain syllogism (see Hamilton Logie 1 pp. 366—385), also called the ‘sorites’, though that term is confined to the synonymous sophism by C., unless we except the doubtful passage in Fin. Iv 50. The simple syllogisms of which the sorites is composed are as follows, (1) All that are blessed are virtuous, the gods are blessed, therefore the gods are virtuous ; (2) all that are virtuous are rational, the gods are virtuous, therefore rational ; (8) all that are rational are in the shape of man, the gods are rational, therefore in human shape.
et libenter quidem : cf. §§ 82, 83 and n. on § 79.
conveniat—necesse est: ‘ we cannot but agree to that.’
quem—daturum. The Epicureans no doubt would answer, not per- haps with the French materialist, that thought was a secretion of the human brain, but that experience told us nothing of the operations of reason except as contained in a human body; and so in fact we find it stated in a Herculanean treatise, quoted on § 48.
opus erat: so bellum erat § 84 n.
sumpsisses tuo jure: Madvig on Jin. 11 35 gives this as an example of the jussive use of the Subj., on which see Roby § 1604 and my n. on dedisses 111 76. Thus taken it would mean, ‘if reason were confined to human shape, you should have assumed the doctrine of anthropomorphism on your own authority’ (without all this reasoning). Otherwise we might take it as an ordinary apodosis after sz ita esset, ‘you would have been justified in assuming it’. Sch. suggests that it is equivalent either to debebas or to poteras sumere. The second no doubt gives the most natural sense, ‘you might have assumed it on your own authority, without asking
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196 BOOK I CH. XXxII § 89,
any one’s leave’; but, though the Inf. with poteram sometimes stands where we might have expected the Plup. Subj., is there any instance of the converse? On tuo jure see § 77 arripere vestro jure n.
quid est istuc gradatim: ‘what do you mean by this phrase of yours?’ In the Mss these words stand before swmpsisses, and Walker followed by Davies and Ernesti omitted them as an expression of bewilder- ment on the part of some ignorant fraterculus, but gradatim is not a particularly puzzling word ; and the clause comes in quite naturally with Facciolati’s transposition. The emendation gui (Sch. Opuse. WI p. 325) is unnecessary : it only expresses in a literal prosaic way what is implied by quid; cf. NV. D. 11 21 cum mundo negas quicquam esse melius, quid dicis melius ? (Allen).
praecipitare istuc quidem: ‘that is not a step, but a plunge’, ‘ her- abstiirzen nicht herabsteigen’, Kiihner ; cf. Ac. 11 63 sustinenda est omnis assensio, ne praecipitet st temere processerit. On the fallacy known as the sal- tus or hiatus ti demonstrando see Hamilton Logie 11 p.51. For the form of expression cf. Z’usc. 11 30 optare hoc quidem est, non docere (Heind.). The Nom. and Acc. N. both in S. and Pl. of the archaic ¢st’e are found in C., cf. de. 1 13 astue quidem considerabo, Div. 1 35 istuce quidem dicunt, Att. XIV 1 non posse istace sic abire.
§ 90. deos hominum similes—quam homines deorum. Cf. the lan- guage in which C. speaks of the anthropomorphic gods of the poets, finge- bat haec Homerus et humana ad deos transferebat ; divina mallem ad nos. Quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, tnvenire, meminisse, Tusc. 1 65.
esse illud huic: Orat. Obl. in loose dependence on dices implied in quaeres.
video: ‘I sce your point’, almost equivalent to ‘granted’.
formae figuram : ‘the outline of their shape’, see § 47 n. If this isa genuine phrase, and not a gloss for formam, its precision was probably intended to prevent the misapprehension of formam in the sense of ‘beauty’. Sch. quotes Lucr. Iv 67 formaz servare figuram, and Off. 1 126 formam nostram reliquamque figuram tn gua esset species honesta, where see Holden.
nati numquam sunt. Immortality was the most universally accepted of the divine attributes, but this was not understood to mean eternity. On the contrary, detailed accounts of the birth of the reigning gods of Olympus were to be found in the poets, and even the primaeval gods were supposed to have sprung from Earth and Chaos. Yet we find traces of the higher doctrine, as in the oracle of Dodona reported by Pausan. x 12 5 Zeds jy, Zeis €otw, Zeds Eaoerat, @ peydre Zev; and Plut. Stoic. Rep. 38 p. 1051 treats this as the universally accepted opinion, @@aprov Kat yevvntoy ovdeis, ws Eros eimeiv, Stavoeitat Gedy (Niig. V. Hom. Theol. pp. 9, 71).
siquidem aeterni sunt futuri: ‘that is, if they are to be eternal’ (as you Epicureans hold, cf. $$ 45, 49, 107, 109). The Fut. Part. is used because the question whether the gods are in future to be called aeterid