BOOK I CH, Xxv § 70. 169

much favoured by Plato (e.g. Sophist. p. 282 foll.) and in later times by Bentham. For an account of the Disjunctive Judgment see Mansel Prod. Log. p. 236 foll., Hamilton 1 239. The Stoics, who prided themselves on their logical refinements and were especially distinguished by the name dialectici, called it d&lwpa dveCevypevoy, thus explained by Diog. L. vir 72 SceCevypevov eoriv 6 bd rod “irow” Scateverixod cuvdéopov (‘disjunctive con- junction’) dcéCevkrat, otov “roe juepa eoriv 7 wé eorw.” emayyéAerat Se 6 civderpos ovtos TO érepov Tav dEiwpdrov Weddos eivar. For etiam cf. Madvy. § 45 (on affirmative and negative answers).
pertimuit ne—fieret necessarium. The Stoics held that their prin- ciple of Necessity was involved in the Disjunctive judgment applied to future events, as may be seen argued at length in Fat. 20 foll., e.g. Since it is absolutely necessary that a man now living must at a given date in the future be either dead or alive, whichever of the two proves eventually to be true must be now a necessary truth though unknown to us ; or, more shortly, his existence or non-existence at that date is a necessary truth ; which of the two it is, will be made apparent by the event. Aristotle dis- cussed the point in his treatise De Interpretatione ch. 9 foll. ‘in regard to the present or past, affirmative or negative judgments of existence are necessarily true or false; but it is not so with regard to the future, otherwise all future events would be fixed by necessity (dare ei év aravre xpdv@ ovTws elyev dote TO Erepov GAnOeverOat, dvaykaioy rv TovTO yeverOat) which is contrary to our own experience of deliberation and action.’ He then solves the difficulty as follows, rd pév ovv eivar 7d dv Grav 7, Kal TO pH Oy py) €ivae Otay pr) 7, avayKn’ ov pijy ovTe TO dv amav dvaykny Etval, oUTE TO My Ov pi) eivat...kat emt Tis avTiupdoews 6 avTos Adyos’ eivar pev 7) fr) ElvaL Grav dvaykn, kal €veaOai ye 7) py’ ov pevtot Suehovta ye eimeiv Oarepov avaykaiop (i.e. the necessity belongs to the compound judgment not to its parts taken separately) ; Aéyw Se oiov dvayxn pev €oecOar vavpayiay avpov 7 wy €oecOat, ov pevtor €oecOai ye adpiov vavpaxiav avaykaiov ovde py yeveoOa. In the De Fato 21, C. says that he would rather accept the teaching of Epicurus e¢ negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse aut falsam than allow that all things happened by necessity, but he cites Carneades to prove that no such consequence as necessity is really involved in the Disjunctive Judgment. In reality Epicurus seems to have taken much the same view as Arist., see fat. 37 nisi forte volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales enun- tiationes nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt (i.e. not yet corresponding to fact but only capable of becoming so) aut, cum id pudet, ilud tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis dijunctiones, sed quae in his enuntiata essent, eorum neutrum esse verum and cf. Zeller Stoics tr. p. 435, and Ueberweg l.c., who points out the qualifications required in applying the Disjunctive Judgment. Johan. Siceliota, quoted by Prantl p. 360, says that Epicurus instanced the famous riddle 8py6a Kat ovK dpyida emi Evdov kai ov €vAov KaOnpevnv Aida kai ov Aidw Badraoy dSiwAecev as contravening the principle of Contradiction.
170 BOOK I CH. XXV § 70.
negavit. For the asyndeton after pertimuit cf. the next sentence urguebat Arcesilas—timuit Epicurus—dixit, and § 106 motum dico esse inanem, tu imagines remanere quae referantur—hoe idem fier, § 121 cum dicat—negat idem esse—tollit id. The effect is to give rapidity and energy to the sentence and to heighten the antithesis.
Arcesilas: the regular Doric and Aeolic contraction for ’Apkecidaos, cf. Ahrens Dial. Dor. p. 199. On the Stoic and Academic theories of per- ception see § 12 n. Ac. 1 40 foll., 11 79 foll. : the controversy between Arc. and Zeno is constantly referred to in the Academica. [Strictly taken, the text misrepresents A. since he did not say omnia falsa esse, but omnia non magis falsa esse quam vera. But possibly Cic. uses the word falsus in the sense of ‘fallacious’, as often in the Academica. J. 8S. R.]
omnes sensus veri nuntios. Cf Madv. Fin. 1 22, Ac. 11 79 eo rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam esse credendum ; Zeller Stozcs tr. p. 402 foll. to avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as such is always, and under all circumstances, to be trusted ; nor ought the delusions of the senses to shape our belief; the causes of these deceptions not lying in sensation as such, but in our judg- ment about sensation’, Lucretius Iv 463 after instancing a number of optical illusions, says that they seek in vain to shake the credit of the senses guoniam pars horum maxima fallit (propter opinatus anim quos addimus ipsi) pro visis ut sint quae non sunt sensibus visa. Here too Ep. might quote Arist. on his side, cf. De Anima 1113 § 3) peév aiaOnors Tar iSiwv det adnOnys, StcavoeicOar S evdéyerar kat Wevdas. To the same effect Augustine (quoted by Lescaloperius zz loc.) says sensus non est falsus inter- nuntius sed falsus gudex,
nihil horum nimis callide. This is Allen’s emendation, put forward in his ed. 1836, for the ndsi callide of the Mss. The same emendation was made by Sch. Opuse. 11 pp. 317 and 364. For the use we may compare our ‘not over cleverly’. In the comic poets nimis often occurs in the sense of valde, which is substituted for callide in some of the mss here, but in later writers it can only bear this force when combined with a negative. [For the form of sentence, cf Orator 82 nihil horum parum audacter. Moser ms. |
plagam accipiebat: so Fat. 21 (of the denial of Disjunctive Judgments) eam plugam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fiert comprobem.
§ 71. dum individuorum—tamquam sanguinem. This is not quite the same as the reason assigned for the quasi-corpus in § 49. There it was used to explain the fact that the Gods were not objects of bodily sensa- tion, but perceptible only to the mind. In a treatise, conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus, which is contained in vol. vi pt. 2 of the first series of Herculanensia, we find both reasons conjoined (p. 35) 81a rovro yap ovdev aiaOntov aOavatov, 1» muKvoTns yap avTiKOmTEL mpos ToUTO Sexopévn mAnyas isxvpds. Sch. in his n. and also in Opusc. Iv 342 maintains that concreiio here must be taken in a narrow sense=nul/a solidior et crassior atomorum