BOOK I CH. xxv § 69, 167

Ch. xxv § 69. hoc persaepe facitis—possit. Three examples follow, (1) the declination of atoms, (2) the denial of the disjunctive judgment (§ 70 idem facit contra dialecticos), (3) the assertion of the infallibility of sensa- tions (§ 70 omnes sensus vert nuntios), all preparing the way for (4), with which we are here concerned (§ 71 idem facit in natura deorum). The same points are criticized elsewhere by C. e.g. (1) in Fin. 1 19, Fat. 22, 46; (2) in Ac. 11 97, Fat. 18 foll. ; (3) Ac. 11 79, see the following notes.
ut satius fuerit. Satius est being used in the Ind. like aequius est, melius est, where we might have expected the Subj. (see n. on longum est § 19), sativus fuit would mean ‘would have been better’, It is here subordinated to ut, like molestum sit in § 2.
si atomi—suopte pondere. This was the only natural and necessary movement of the atoms according to Dem.; but since the larger and heavier atoms overtook the smaller and lighter in their downward descent, by striking against them, they initiated a secondary movement, which might be in any direction, but which resulted finally in the creative vortex. The authorities on which this account rests are given by Zeller, who points out that some of the ancient writers neglected to notice the original movement, and made Dem. assume as his first principle, either the motion of mutual impact, wAnyy (as Cic. Fat. 46 aliam quandam vim motus habebant (atomt) a Democrito impulsionis, a te Epicure gravitatis et ponderis), or even the resulting vortex, divn (e.g. Diog. L. 1x 44 héperOa ev TG ddo@ Suvovpevas tas dTopouvs).
nihil fore in nostra potestate. Epicurus ap. Diog. L. x 134 speaks of the blessedness of the man who has learnt that necessity, to which others assign a despotic power, is only a name for the results of chance or of man’s free will, émel kpeirrov jv TO mepi Oedv pvOm Kataxodovbeiv i) TH TOY dvoikay civappevn Sovdevew" 6 pev yap edAmida rapatnoews vroypaper Deady dia Tips, 7 S€ dwapairnroy €yer tHv avayxny. The same reason is assigned for the introduction of the clinamen in Fat. 22 foll. (cf. 46 foll.) Zpicurus veritus est, ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus ut atomorum motu cogeretur, to which the Academic disputant replies (1) that the single downward movement does not necessarily involve the doctrine of necessity, and (2) that in any case the supposition of the clinamen would not avert such a consequence. Philodemus, in his treatise rept anuetwv (Gomp. p. 44), allows that this movement cannot be proved from the fact of free will, unless it is consistent with our experience on all points, ovy ixavov eis ro mpoadéEarOat tas ém éhaxtotoy tapeykXioets TOY atopav Sia TO TUxnpoY Kal TO Tap’ pas (causal use of mapa) dda Set mpooendeiEa Kal ro pndapads Etépm paxeoOar trav evapyov. Accordingly we find another reason given in fin. I 19 viz. that as all atoms move at the same rate in vacuo (ovre yap ta Bapéa Oarrov olaOnaerat pixpav Kal Kovpar, orav ye On pndev dravra avrois Diog. L. x 61)— a point in which Ep. corrected the erroneous doctrine of his predecessor— there was no possibility of one overtaking the other, but all must move
168 BOOK I CH. xxv § 69.
downwards in parallel lines without any meeting or collision. Both reasons are combined in Lucr. 11 216—293.
nihil fore—quod esset: in direct speech, nihil erit quod est.
derecto deorsus: cf. derecto transversas Caes. B. C. 11 9.
declinare paululum=kiveio9ar xara rapéyxXuow Stob. Ecl. p. 346 ; ef. Fat, 22 cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo, id appellat édaytorov. [Simi- larly Fin. 119 declinare atomum perpaulum, quo nihil fiert possit minus ; Lucr. 11 219 paulum, tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis. J.S. R.]
§ 70. hoc dicere turpius est: cf. /’n. 119 ait enim declinare atomum sine causa ; quo nihil turpius physico, quam fiert quicquam sine causa dicere, and Fat. 18.
dialecticos. The word d:adexrixy, used by Plato for philosophical dis- cussion and then for philosophy itself, was restricted by Aristotle to the Logic of Probabilities, while he gives to Formal Logic the name 7 dvadv- Tikn OY dmodecktixn emiotnun. By the later schools (excepting the Stoics who gave a wider meaning to Aoyixn) Aoyeen and Siadextixy Were used in- discriminately for the science of reasoning generally, as in Fin. 1 22 in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi et disserendi, quae oyn dicitur, iste vester (Epicurus) plane tnermis ac nudus est ; Fat. 1 tota est Noyexn, quam rationem disserendi voco; De Orat. 11 157 videsne Diogenem fu- isse qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudi- candi, quam verbo Graeco Siadextrixny appellaret? cf. Fin. 1 17 foll, where we find also the term dialectici used of logicians in opposition to rhetores; so in Div. 11 11 it is opposed to physici, see Zeller Stoves tr. p- 69 foll.
disjunctionibus, in quibus aut etiam aut non poneretur. Cf. Ac. 1195 fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant agiwpa—aut verum esse aut falsum; § 97 etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet’, cum dialectict sie statuant omne quod ita disjunctum sit, quasi aut etiam aut non, non modo verum esse sed etiam necessarium ; (vide quam sit catus is quem isti tardum putant. Sti enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere. Nulla autem est in natura rerum talis necessitas)—cum hoc igitur dialectict pugnent, id est Antiochus et Stoict ; totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis disjunctio (contraria autem ea dico cum alterum aiat alterum neget) si talis disjunctio fulsa potest esse, nulla vera est; Top. 56 dialecticorum modi plures sunt qui ex disjunc- tionibus constant: aut hoe aut tllud: hoc autem: non igitur ulud. TItemque, aut hoe aut illud: non autem hoc: illud igitur. Quae conclusiones idcirco ratae sunt, quod in disjunctione plus uno verum esse non potest. It is the principle now known as the Law of Excluded Middle (see Hamilton Logie vol. 1 pp. 83, 90 foll., Ueberweg Log. tr. pp. 285—284, Mansel Prol. Log. p- 208 foll., Arist. Met. 11 7 p. 100, Prantl Gesch. d. Log. 1 pp. 143, 403, 449 foll.), and upon it is grounded the dichotomic or bifurcate division so