BOOK I CH. XxIV § 66. 165

ante enim—amittere. Cf. n. on § 17 libero judicio, and Zeller Epi- cureans, tr. p. 394, where many passages are quoted in illustration of the rigid dogmatism of the Epicurean school. Thus the last words of the founder to his disciples were trav doyparav peurvicOa Diog. L. x 16; any divergence from the dogmas was looked upon as rapavopnpua, paddov b€ doéBnua, kai Katéyvwota TO Kaworounbev, Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv 5; and Philodemus (quoted by Hirzel p. 107) says that Epicureans who are guilty of schism ov wdvv paxpay tis Tév TaTpadoLoy Karadixns aheotnkaoww. Hirzel however has shown (pp. 98—190) that there was more of movement and variety in the Epicurean school than has been generally recognized. Quin- tilian x1r 2 says the same of philosophers in general, haec inter ipsos gui, velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitione constricti, nefus ducant a sus- cepta semel persuasione discedere.
§ 67. quid enim mereas: ‘what would tempt you to abandon the system?’ lit. ‘what would you take as pay, what bribe must one offer you?’ Sch. quotes Fin. 1 74 quid merearis ut dicas te omnia voluptatis causa facturum? Verr. Iv 135 quid arbitramini Reginos merere velle ut ab its marmorea ila Venus auferatur? cf. also Phil. 1 34 putasne illum immorta- litatem merert voluisse ut propter armorum habendorum licentiam metueretur, where see var. nn. It is a colloquial phrase and occurs not unfrequently in Plautus.
nihil—deseram: ‘nothing would tempt me to forsake happiness and truth ’.
ista—est veritas: for the attraction of istud see §§ 77, 122, and Roby § 1068.
nam de vita—langueat: ‘as to happiness I make no objection ; your system may be productive of that inactivity which you call happiness’. Plane otio langueat: ‘absolutely dying of ennui’, cf. § 7.
sed ubi—fingentibus: ‘can unchanging truth exist in those ever- changing worlds, or in senseless atoms ?’
mundis innumerabilibus: cf. Fin. 1 21 innumerabiles mundi qui et oriantur et intereant cotidie and my n. on § 53. Epicurus defines the term in his epistle to Pythocles (Diog. L. x 88) kocpos éori mepioyy res ovpavod aotpa Te kal mavra Ta havipeva Trepiéxovca, dmoTopny €xovca amd TOU dmeipov. Worlds are infinite in number, of all shapes and sizes, and perish, not as Democritus said from collision with other worlds, but from their own perishable nature (Diog. 90, cf. Lucr. v 235 foll.).
omnibus minimis: so 1 141 omnes minimos frigoris appulsus, 11 86 in regnis omnia minima curant, cf. Madv. on Fin. 111 3.
nulla moderante natura: apparently contradictory to § 53, where Vell. says the world is natura effectum: but there natura is opposed to an intelligent agent, here it is used rather in the Stoic sense and opposed to the capricious movements of the atoms, cf. Sch.’s n. here and my n. on § 65. '
liberalitatis : his promise in § 62 to pass over all that was common to
166 BOOK 2. CH: XXIV 9-67.
Ep. with other philosophers, including therefore his atomic doctrine so far as it was the same with that of Dem. ; ef. Ain. 1 18 sed hoe commune vitium (the general atomic doctrine), ae propriae Epicuri ruinae (the declinatio).
[tecum uti: ‘employ in my dealings with you’, cf. hoc tecum oro Pl. Bacch, 491, docte atque astu mihi captandumst cum illo Most. 1055 with Lorenz’s n. Ussing on Asin. 655, and my Gir. § 1885. R.]
§ 68. sint sane—ante quam nati. For the ellipse of the verb with aeterni, nulli dei, and especially in the subordinate clauses guod ex atomis, st natum, see Draeg. § 116, (who compares ut tu Velleius and quot hominum linguae § 84) and Roby § 1443, who cites § 110 sine virtute certe nullo modo foll.
paulo ante—disputabas: see § 20. To avoid this palpable incon- sistency, some Epicureans appear to have introduced a third principle, besides atoms and void, in the omotdrynres, otherwise called dpoopéperac or ototxeta, Plut. Plac. Phil. p. 882 A, Stob. Eel. p. 66; but if we arrived at a right conclusion in our discussion of § 49, this 3rd principle consists only of a subordinate class of atoms composing the divine images which are always streaming in upon the soul. It might be argued that these have nothing conereti about them, but merely produce an impression of a con- tinuous form by their ceaseless repetition ; that they have never coalesced into an actual whole, and are therefore in danger of no dissolution. It is doubtful how far such a defence could apply to the images ; in any case it is not applicable to the ordinary Epicurean Gods of the crtermundia. The considerations which seem to have been urged for the immortality of the latter by the disciples of this school are (1) the equilibrium described in §§ 50, 109, (2) the preservative influence of goodness alluded to in Plut. Def. Orae. p. 420, where the Epicurean argues against the demons of Empedocles on the ground ds ov duvatoy éate davdovs kal dpaptytixods dvras pakaplous kal paxpaiwvas eivar, ToAAnY TUpdotyta Tis Kakias éyovans kal TO TepimT@TiKov Tois avaipetixots (‘susceptibility to destructive influ- ences’). To which it is replied that goodness has nothing to do with the duration of the bodily organism, 66ev ovk ed r@ Oe@ Thy aiditynTa movotvow ex cbuAdakijs Kal Olaxpovoews TOY avaipeTLKar.
quod cum efficere vultis: ‘for when you would prove this’ (that the divinity is possessed of such attributes).
in dumeta correpitis: ‘you hide yourself in the thickets’. Cf. Ac. 1 112 cum sit enim campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? So often spinae and spinosus With a slightly different force, of the perplexing arguments of the Stoics.
ita: explained by the following infinitival clause, as in Fat. 24 ia dicimus, velle aliquid sine causa, Tuse. I 71 tta dicebat, duas esse vias, WI 41 ita—laetitiam esse, see Mady. Fin. 11 13, 17, 1 53, V 77; and compare the use of the epexegetic clause after a demonstrative or relative, Draeg. § 484.