BOOK I CH. xx § 61. 157

protasis, ‘which, if it had been used, would have been unworthy of a man of ordinary understanding’?
non modo philosophia sed prudentia: ‘such as would have beseemed, I do not say, a philosopher, but &c.’ See Div. 1 124 non modo plura sed etiam pauciora with Allen’s n. and Roby § 2240. For exx. of non modo in the 2nd clause cf. Mayor’s Second Philippie § 107.
difficile est negare. Compare for a similar objection similarly met Div. 11 70, where C. the augur, is arguing against auspices ‘difficilis augurt locus ad contra dicendum’. Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillimus.
credo si in contione: ‘I grant you it would be if the question were put in a public assembly, but in a party of friends, such as this, it is easy’. Cf. Div. 11 28 soli sumus, licet verum inquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti, i.e. we may inquire whether divination is a reality without being called impious; also Varro ap. Aug. C. D. v1 5, where, after giving the famous division of religion into mythical (of poets), natural (of philosophers), political (of statesmen)—a division which we may compare with Gibbon’s language ‘the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful’—he goes on to say of the 2nd facilius inter parietes in schola quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures. So Torquatus is challenged to assert the doctrines of Epicurus in conventu aut, st coronam times, in senatu Fin. 11 74.
ego ipse pontifex. Besides representing the academic doctrine, Cotta, if we may judge from such passages as III 5, 43, is intended to express the opinions of an older pontifex, Q. Mucius Scaevola, the friend and patron of C. and the author, according to Aug. C. D. Iv 27, of the triple division of theology given above. While condemning the vulgar (mythical) theology as immoral and degrading, he preferred that the philosophic view should be held as an esoteric truth only, not communicated to the mass for whom stronger stimulants were necessary, which were to be provided in an innocent form by the State-religion. Varro describes it as follows, tertiwm genus est quod in urbibus cives, maxime sacerdotes, nosse atque administrare debent. In quo est quos deos publice colere, quae sacra et sacrificia facere quemque par sit, Aug. C. D. v1 5. But as Augustine shows, it was impossible to purge this of the evils charged against the vulgar belief without entirely altering its character, a task which was beyond the power of any magistrate to effect. In the De Divinatione C. has the same réle as Cotta here, and puts forward political expediency and popular belief as the reasons for upholding reli- gion, retinetur et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates reipublicae mos, religio, disciplina, jus augurium, collegit auctoritas, Div. 1170. It was the policy of the Empire, introduced by Augustus on the advice of his minister Maecenas ; cf. the speech put into the mouth of the latter by Dion. Cass. Li 36, where the maintenance of the national religion and the prohibition of strange rites are recommended as the best protection against political revolution or conspiracy. But the attempt to retain religion simply as an
158 BOOK I CH. XxII § 61.
instrument of police has never succeeded. Without belief it is too weak to be of service ; with belief it is too powerful.
ego—is. On the use of zs in reference to the First and Second Persons see Draeg. § 40.
non opinione sed ad veritatem : ‘not as a matter of faith merely (lit. ‘in the way of belief’, Abl. of Manner, Roby § 1236, or possibly Abl. of Instrument ‘by means of belief’) but in accordance with the actual truth’, cf. the opposition of xara dc€ay and mpos dAndeav ovddoyiCecOa Arist. Anal. Post.1 19 p. 81b.
nulli esse: ‘not to exist at all’, So § 65 quae nullae sunt, § 97 nulla esse dicamus, cf. Mady. § 455 obs. 5.
§ 62. placet mihi deos esse. So we read of the Sceptics evpeOnce- Tat 6 SkenTikos Kata pev Ta TaTpia €On Kal Tovs vopous A€ywv eivar Oeovs Kar may TO €is THY TOUT@Y OpnoxKeiay Kal evoeBetay GuVTEivoy Tomy, TO S€ Goov emt TH Procdde nrycet undev mporerevopevos, Sext. Emp. Math. 1x § 49. The Academic’s acceptance of the traditional creed ‘on the authority of our ancestors’ (majoribus nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere debeo, N.D. 1 6) reminds one of Hume’s scoffing patronage of Christianity against ‘those dangerous friends who have undertaken to defend it by the princi- ples of human reason’. ‘Our most holy religion’, he says, ‘is founded on faith not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure’. There is a natural affinity between the extremes of scepticism and of authority, as there is between democracy and despotism.