Chapter 127
C. maintains a particular interpretation of the Epicurean doctrine of plea-
sure on the strength of his recollection of Z.’s lectures. Philodemus made great use of his writings, see Introduction on the sources of the W. D., and Hirzel p. 27 foll.
coryphaeum. Kopvdaios, from kopupy (itself used metaphorically like vertex and apex), has the general sense of ‘a leader’ in Herodotus; but in later writers is commonly employed in the narrower sense of ‘leader of the chorus’ (the ¢£apyos of older poetry), cf. Donaldson Yheatre of the Greeks pp. 29 and 215. From this special meaning the word again passes to a wider metaphorical sense, and is used of philosophers by Plato Theaet. 1730, of Demosthenes by Dion. Hal. Rhet. 1 8 (rov rod ryedarod yxopov Nyeuova te Kal xopudaiov), of St Peter and St Paul by the ecclesiastical writers, cf. Erasmus Adag. pp. 485, 1079, 1497, Suicer s.v. Iérpos. The Latin form does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Classical writers.
cum Athenis essem. Though C. introduces himself to us at the beginning as an impartial auditor (§ 17) and though at the end (111 95) he says that his sympathies are more with Balbus than with Cotta, yet it is to the latter that he ascribes his personal experiences both here and in §§ 79, 93. So we learn from Aét. xm 19 that he had some thought of trans- ferring to Cotta his own part in the Academica.
audiebam : ‘attended lectures’.
et quidem—Philone; ‘and in fact on P.’s own recommendation’.
156 BOOK I CH. XXI § 59.
usu venit: cf. Roby § 1238.
bona venia me audies. A wish is here implied by the Fut. Ind. as in the English idiom ; cf. Roby §§ 1589, 1590,
§ 60. maxime in physicis. It will be remembered that this includes theology.
quid non sit—dixerim: cf. Lact. Jnst. 11 3 falswm intellegere est quidem saptentiae sed humanae: verum autem scire divinae est sapientiae. Ita philo- sophi quod summum furt humanae sapientiae assecuti sunt, ut intellegerent quid non sit: ilud assequi nequiverunt ut dicerent quid sit.
Ch. xx. Simonides: the lyric poet of Ceos, B.c. 550—470, one of the illustrious circle (including Pindar, Epicharmus, Aeschylus) whom Hiero tyrant of Syracuse (d. 467 B.c.) attracted to his court. In Xenophon’s /ieron Sim. is introduced as conversing with H. on the advantages and disadvan- tages of tyranny. Some of his gnomic sayings are discussed in Plato’s dia- logues, e.g. Protag. 339 B, Rep. 1 3318. Minucius (c. 13) reports the story correctly, but Tertullian carelessly assigns the words to Thales in answer to Croesus (Apol. c. 46, Ad Nat. 112). On the general subject see Arnob. Il 19 guidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitae mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum translit et corrumpitur sensum...unus est hominis intellectus de Det natura certissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi ; and the reff. in Church’s n. on the famous passage of Hooker 1 2 ‘our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him’; also the catena on Docta Jgnorantia in Hamilton’s Discussions p. 634 foll. But this assertion that the Cause of all things passes understanding is not (as H. Spencer, for instance, maintains /%rst Principles p. 101) inconsistent with the further assertion that he is pos- sessed of certain attributes. A cause may be unknown in itself, but if we know its effects we can argue back from thezr qualities to zts qualities, with a confidence proportioned to the number and variety of its ascertained effects. A child may be incapable of forming a general estimate of his father’s character, but he is not thereby precluded from trusting and loving him as faithful and good. The opposite view leaves men helpless victims to any superstition, agnosticism being merely an exceptional and superficial phase, possible in the study or laboratory, impossible to retain and act upon amid the trials and difficulties of real life.
doctus—traditur: sc. fuzsse. On such ellipses cf. Draeger § 116, P. S. Gr. p. 346, and Reid’s Lael. index under ‘ellipse’.
§ 61. cum illo malo disserere: repeated in § 87. Epic. is directly addressed § 88 num quid tale Epicure vidisti? as in Ac, 11 123, Fin. 1 22, Tusc. 111 37; so Carneades Div. I 23, Cratippus Div. 1 108, 109.
dicit—esset. This apparent exception to the Sequence of Tenses is generally explained on the principle that dicit=dizit, as in § 39 fluerent (where see n.), § 40 appellarent, Fin. 11 71 verissime defenditur quidquid aequum esset id honestum fore with Madv.’s n., Draeg. § 152. 1, Krueger’s Unters. 11 49 foll. Should it not rather be treated as a case of suppressed
