BOOK I CH. XVI § 43. 137

quoted on § 25; it is defined by Diog. L. x 33 as ‘a general conception retained in the mind’, ‘the memory of what has been often perceived’ ; ‘on uttering the word man, the type at once rises up xara mpoAnuw (i.e. prior to logical analysis) in accordance with our previous sensations’, Hence ove (nteiv ove dopey avev mpoAn eos Sext. Emp. Math. 1 57 (sine qua... potest), cf. Clem. Al. Strom. 11 157. Chrysippus appears to have borrowed the word from Ep. (see § 54), defining it as ¢vvora huciky tév Kabddov Diog. L. vir 54. In an interesting chapter of Epictetus (Diss. 1 22) we read that rpodnwWers, general principles, are common to all men, and consistent with each other : differences arise when we attempt to apply them, e.g. all allow that rd dcvov must be preferred to all things, but it is a question between Jews and Romans whether it is dcvov to eat swine’s flesh. Educa- tion consists in learning to apply ras guoixdas mpoAnweis tais emt pépous ovcias kara\AnAws ty Pvoet. Prolepsis then, whether as understood by the Epicureans (the permanent image), or with a more ideal colouring by the Stoics, corresponds to the Idea of Plato, the Form of Aristotle, the Innate Idea of later times : by some of the Fathers (e.g. Theod. Gr. Aff. p. 16, 9; Clem. J.c.) it was identified with Faith. Besides the terms informatio, praenotio and anticipatio, C. uses for it notio and notitia, which are properly equivalents of the more general évvoa, cf. Ac. IL 30 notitiae rerum quas Graect tum évvoias tum mporners vocant; Tusc. 1 57 (of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence) nec fiert ullo modo posse ut a puerrs tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quast consignatas in animis notiones, quas évvoias vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset ; Top. 31 notionem appello quod Graeci tum evvonav tum mpornw dicunt: ea est insita et praecepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens; Madv. Fin. 111 21, Vv 59; Bake on Leg. 1 26, 30, 59, where zncohatae tntellegentiae=mpodrnes.
informatio: ‘shaping’, ‘outline’, then ‘conception’.
caelesti volumine: entitled epi xpitnpiov 7 aver, ‘the test or standard of truth’ Diog. L. x 27, Zeller Stoves tr. p. 400 foll. We find it referred to as rods Swomereis kavovas Plut. adv. Colot. 19.
Ch. xvi. § 44. non instituto: so Z'usc. 1 30 nec enim rd (esse deos) con- locutio hominum effect, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus, i.e. ov vouw adda ioe. So Philod. p. 128 (we worship the Gods) ov povoy dia rods vduous adda dia vorxas airias, Diog. L. X 123 Oeot pév yap eiow" évapyns pev yap eat avtaev 7 yvoots.
ad unum omnium: ‘all without exception’.
insitas vel potius innatas: ‘implanted or rather inbred’. The two words are often joined to express natural growth as opposed to artificial training, e.g. Fin. Iv 4 insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae; Verr. Iv 48 the belief that Sicily is sacred to Ceres and Libera is so firmly held by the natives wt animis eorum insitum atque innatum esse videatur, also v 23; in Top. 69 the opposite quality is expressed by the phrase adsumptis atque adventicits. It does not seem necessary to suppose
138 BOOK I CH. XVII § 44.
any error on the part of C. as though he ascribed to Epic. the doctrine of ‘innate ideas’ in the sense in which Locke (certainly not Plato, for with him the idea was latent till developed by patevrixn ; nor Descartes, see Huxley’s Hume p. 83) understood the term. All that is implied is that our religious ideas are not arbitrarily imposed from without, but grow up within as a natural and necessary result of experience. We must understand crnatum in the same sense in I 12, cf. Sch. Opuse. Iv 345, who remarks that @ principio innasct is the phrase used (11 34) of what is strictly inborn.
de quo autem—confitendum est. [The argument is obscured by the ordinary punctuation. Putting a comma after habemus we get the follow- ing syllogism : We all have from nature an idea of Gods: what all men’s nature agrees about is true: ergo we must admit the existence of Gods. R.]
omnium natura=omnes natura, cf. n. on § 36.
hanc igitur habemus: resumes fateamur habere. Yor the resumptive use of igzitur after parenthesis and for the change from Inf. to Ind. cf. Draeger § 355, Madv. § 480. A close parallel occurs in “Jin. 11 22 quid enim merere velis...quid merearis igitur &e.
ut putemus: explains hance, which has the force of talem, cf. § 55 illa ut.
§ 45. ipsorum: the existence of the Gods, as opposed to their attributes.
insculpsit in mentibus: so in animo quasi insculptum est esse deos 11 12.
quod beatum—essent omnia: quoted from the kxvpia doéar, an epitome of the ethical principles of Epicurus, which he intended to be committed to memory by his disciples, see § 85, Fin. 11 20 quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri rvpias Sas? Diog. L. x 35. It is preserved by Diog. x 139, and commences with the words here translated 7d paxaptov kat _ apOaprov ovre avto mpaypara €xet, oUTE GAM TapEeXEL, GaTE OVTE dpyais ovUTE xapioe ouvexerac’ ev avOevet yap may Td Totovrov, cf. Philod. p. 123 ywpis opyjs Kal xaptros aoevovons, Lucr. 11 646 omnis enim per se divom natura necessest | immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur | semota ab nostris rebus sgunctaque longe; | nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis | ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, | nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tan- gitur.ira. The argument in full is: the Gods are happy; happiness con- sists in the absence of trouble, whether experienced in oneself or inflicted upon another; therefore the Gods neither feel nor cause trouble ; hence the motive of anger, which might lead to their infliction of trouble, and the motive of favour, which might lead to their taking trouble for others, are alike manifestations of weakness, and inconsistent with our idea of the Divine majesty. The answer to which is that (1) the word ‘trouble’ is unmeaning in reference to our idea of God: if we suppose him to be almighty, thought and action are as easy to him as breathing to us: (2) while it is true that passion and caprice are marks of weakness and, as such, inconsistent with our idea of God, yet a righteous government, re- warding virtue and punishing vice, is a natural corollary to the belief in a