C. Leg. 118 lex est summa ratio insita in natura quae jubet ea quae facienda

sint, prohibetque contraria ; also § 42, and more explicitly 11 8, ‘the wisest have held that law is no device of man, but that it is aeternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis det’; and § 110 erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura ...quae non tum denique incipit lex esse cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est; orta autem est siinul cum mente divina. Quamobrem lex vera atque princeps, apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. Stobaeus Av/. 11 6 p. 204 gives the Greek definition (6 vépuos) Adyos dpOds €OTL TPOTTAKTLKOS PevY OY ToLnTEoY, AmayopevTiKos S€ Gv ov ToinTEov. Sco Hooker, Lect. Pol. 1 ch. 2—6, and Wordsworth, Ode to Duty, where God is regarded as the common source of the natural and the moral law. Pro- bably Zeno would not have objected to a definition of God with which we have been made familiar of late, ‘a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness ’.
eamque vim obtinere=evepye?, ‘it (the law of nature) has its force in commanding’, ‘its function is to command’, so e7m habere Leg. u 9 (of law, quae vis est aequalis, ‘coeval with’, ilius caelum atque terras tuentis et regentis dev).
animantem. But the Stoic lays it down as the first attribute of Deity ut sit animans NV. D. 11 45. The use of the abstract name Nomos is no more inconsistent with the idea of a living God, than the similar use of the abstract Logos. Compare the misunderstanding of the term mpévota § 18.
aethera: the physical, as Law is the moral manifestation of God, cf. § 33 on Aristotle, and below on Cleanthes and Chrysippus, also 11 23 foll.
si intellegi potest : see Sch. Opuse. 111 311, who compares Fam. 1x 17 de lucro prope jam quadriennium vivimus, si aut hoe lucrum est, aut hace vita. The phrase is properly used when we doubt about the correctness of some expression without questioning the fact stated, as in Juvenal’s sz ria est. Its use here is a piece of colloquial carelessness, but there is no need to alter it, as Heind. and others have done. For znéel/. cf. §§ 25, 27, 30.
qui numquam occurrit : ‘never comes across one’, cf. $$ 46, 76 foll.
rationem—pertinentem : ‘the all-pervading reason’ is of course only another name for the lex naturalis. For omnem some edd. have omnium: both forms are found, e.g. II 36 rerum omnium natura, so Leg. I 61 and Iz 16; on the other hand we have naturam rerum omnem, N. D. 1 27; cf. Munro on Lucr. 11 646, Sch. Opuse. 111 330 and 361. Pertinentem= Sujxovra as in M. Aurel. v 32 6 dca ths ovclas Siyxwy Aoyos. Virgil gives it a poetical form Geo. Iv 220 foll. deum namque ire per omnes | terrasque trac- tusque maris caelumque profundum, and Aen. vi 724, cf. Heinze Logos p. 85 foll.
vi divina esse affectam. Sch. Opuse. 11 313, doubts the correctness of the phrase, thinking such a use of afficere unfitted to express a natural