BOOK I CH. XII § 30. 119

dyabat macav apetny, Oeods adrods eivar prcoper, cite ev oduaow évovcat, (6a dvta, Koopotcr mavra ovpavey, Eire Ory Kal Oras.
ut Graeci dicunt dodparoy: there seems no reason for doubting the genuineness of these words, as Heind. and Ba. have done; see n. on physio- logiam § 20. There is a special reason for adding the Greek here, as the Latin equivalents were not introduced till later, incorporalis appearing first in Seneca, zncorporeus in Gellius. The doctrine that all that is corporeal is in its own nature mortal, yeyynrov kai POaprov, runs through the whole of Plato (see § 20n.) and we find the unseen, which is eternal, contrasted with things seen and temporal in Z%m. 28; but it is only the Demiurgus who is essentially incorporeal; many of the inferior deities are clothed in bodies.
id—intellegi non potest: ‘a divine incorporeity is inconceivable’, cf. § 27 on Thales. The absence of feeling involved absence of forethought and absence of pleasure, see § 48. C.’s own opinion is given 7wsc. 1 50, where speaking of those gud nequeunt qualis animus sit vacans corpore intellegere et cogitatione comprehendere, he says quasi vero intellegant qualis sit in ipso corpore; and a little further certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitatione complectt volumus. Again Tuse. 1 71 dubitare non possumus quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni nec dividi nec discerpi nec distrahi potest, ne tnterire quidem igitur. Plato argues against those who identified matter and existence, ravrév capa Kat ovoiav oprCouevor in the Soph. 246 foll. where the term do@parov occurs.
§ 31 Xenophon: see Krische 204—234, Philodemus p. 71 &y rots Eevohartos aropynuoveryaow ovxy épacbal now rod Oeod rHv poppyy adda tapya. The passage referred to is quoted by Clem. Al. Protr. § 71, Strom. v § 109, and by others among the early Christian writers : it occurs in Mem. Iv 3 § 13, where Socrates says that Euthydemus will soon be convinced of the providential government of the world, if he is content to see the ‘Gods in their works without waiting to see them in bodily form, ay pév H) dvapévns ews Gv tas popdas trav Oedv ins, addN’ e~apxh oor Ta epya avtav opévta o¢€BerOat kai Tiuav Tovs Oeovs, a very different assertion from that of the Epicurean critic here, who would identify this with the view just before attributed to Plato (dewm nominari non posse, anquiri non debere). The next assertion et solem et animum deum is founded upon the same passage of the Memorabilia, where Socrates illustrates our inability to look upon God by the parallel case of the sun, 6 maou bavepos Soxay eivat HAtos ovK emiTpéret Tois avOpwrots EavTdv akpiBas dpa, GAN’ éav tis adrov dvadds eyyerph Ocacbar thy Ow apapeira, and of the soul dvOpwrov ye Wuyy, 7 «imep te Kai GAAo Tdv avOpwrivey Tod Oeiov perexet, OTe pev Baoirever ev rpiv Gavepdr, dparat dé ovd airy. It is unne- cessary to say that in neither case does X. make the assertion attributed to him in the text. Thirdly it is stated that X. speaks of God at one time in the singular, at another time in the plural. This no doubt is true,
120 BOOK I CH. XH § 31.
not exclusively of X. but of the greater part of the Greek philosophers (as even of the critic here § 25) both in popular speech (in Plato /Apist. 13 p- 363 B it is made the sign to distinguish between the esoteric and exoteric, THs pev yap omovdaias emictoAys eds apyet, Oeot S€ rhs Hrrov) and in their more scientific treatises, where they speak, now of the Supreme Deity himself, now of the subordinate gods who are his agents. This distinction appears in the same passage of the Memorabilia, of re yap addot jyiv riyaba SiSovtes ovdev trovtwy eis rovppaves idvtes SudSdact, Kal 6 Tov Gdov KOopOY GuUYTaTT@Y TE Kal GUVexwY GopaTos Hui eo.
facit Socratem disputantem...eundemque dicere. Tither the Inf. or Part. may follow faczo in the sense of ‘to represent’. Of the former we have an ex. in 11 41 quem Homerus conveniri facit ab Ulixe, and 1 19 con- strut mundum facit ; of the latter in Brut. 218 colloquentem facit ; of the two combined in this passage and in Z'use. V 115 Polyphemum Homerus cur ariete colloquentem facit ejusque laudare fortunas quod qua vellet ingredi posset 3 cf. Madv. § 372 obs. 5, Draeg. § 442. 2.
sunt isdem in erratis quibus: cf. sunt in varietate § 2 n. For the omission of the preposition before the relative see Zumpt § 778, Madv. § 323 obs. 1, Niigelsb. Sti. § 121. 2, Moser ad Tusc. 1 94, and Heindorf’s n. here.
ch. x1 § 32 Antisthenes. Krische 234—246. C. is here translating from Philodemus p. 72 map’ ’Avria ever © ev pev TH Gvaotk@ éyerat TO Kata vouov evat TOANOVS Oeovs, Kata d€ vow eva (compare Varro’s classification of theology as fabulosum, naturale, civile Aug. C. D. v1 5). Before the decipherment of this fragment, C.’s statement was unsupported by any independent authority, but we have a saying of Ant. reported by Theodoret (Graec. Aff. 1 14) which agrees very well with it, Oeds a6 eixdvos ov yvapi- (erat, ofOarpots odx oparat, ovdevi Coxe’ Siomep avtov ovdets exuabeiv &€& ciovos Ouvarat.
tollit vim—deorum: that is, of the anthropomorphic gods of Epi- curus and of the popular belief.
Speusippus: cf. Krische 247—258. Spengel and Sauppe in their editions of Philodemus find an allusion to Sp. in the lines just preceding the account of Aristotle (Gomp. p. 72) but there is nothing there which could illustrate the account here given, which is in fact unsupported by any ancient authority. We know hardly anything of Sp. except that he modified the teaching of his master in the Pythagorean direction. The criticism here is as reckless as in the case of Antisthenes.
vim quandam dicens: understand the predicate dewm as in § 28 on Pythagoras.
§ 33 Aristoteles: cf. Krische 259—311. The treatise here referred to is no longer extant. It is also cited by Philodemus p. 72, but unfortu- nately the fragment gives no more than the words map’ ’Apiororéder 3 ev TO TpiT@ Tept pirocopias. Diog. L. v 22 tells us it consisted of three beoks ; see Zeller? m1 p. 58, foll. who shows that Krische is wrong in