SECTION IV.

CHAP. I.
Let us then, in the next place, consider the opposing arguments, what they are, and what reason they possess. And if we should dis- cuss some things a little more abundantly, in consequence of speaking freely and at leisure, it is requisite that you should promptly attend to, and endure what, we say. For it is neces- sary that great labour should be bestowed on the greatest disciplines, and that they should he accurately explored for a long time, if you intend to know them perfectly. Do you, there- fore, conformably to the present hypothesis, propose the arguments which occasion the doubt, and I will answer you. Say then, very much perplexes me to understand how su- perior beings^ when invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their in- feriors.^' But I will unfold to you the whole division, which is worthy of regard, concerning the powers that are invoked ; from which you will be able clearly to define what is possible
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and what is impossible, in the subjects of your investigation. For the Gods, indeed, and the natures that are more excellent than we, through the wish of what is beautiful, and from an un- envying and exuberant fulness of good, benevo- lently impart to those that are worthy, such things as are fit for them, commiserating the labours of sacerdotal men, but being delighted with those that they have begotten, nourished, and instructed. But the middle genera are the inspective guardians of judgment. These in- form us what ought to be done, and from what it is fit to abstain. They also give assistance to just works, but impede such as are unjust ; and as many endeavour to take away unjustly the property of others, or basely to injure or destroy some one, they cause these to suffer the same things as they have done to others. But there is, likewise, another most irrational genus of daemons,* which is without judgment, and is allotted only one power, through an arrangement by which each of these daemons presides over one work alone. As therefore, it is the province of a sword to cut, and to do
* According to Proclus, in Alcibiad. Prior, there are three orders of daemons, the first of which are more intellectual, the second are of a more rational nature, and the third, of which lamblichus is now speaking, are variotis, more iri'a- tional, and more material.
nothing else than this, thus also of the spirits which are distributed in the universe, accord- ing to the partible necessity of nature, one kind divides, but another collects, things which are generated. This, however, is known from the pheenomena. For the Charonean* spira- cles, as they are called, emit from themselves a certain spirit, which is able to corrupt pro- miscuously every thing that falls into them. Thus, therefore, of certain invisible spirits, each is allotted a different power, and is alone adapted to do that which it is ordained to per- form. He, therefore, who turns from their natural course things which contribute to the universe in an orderly manner, and illegiti- mately performs a certain thing, in this case receives the injury arising from that which he uses badly. This, however, pertains to another mode of discussion.
* Charonea is a country of Asia Minor, bordering on the river Meander ; and in it there are spiracles which exhale a foul odour. According to Pliny, there are places of this kind in Italy, in the country of Puteoli, now Puzzulo. In Amsanctus, also, a place in the middle of Italy, in the coun- try of the Samnites, there were sulphureous waters, the steams of which were so pestilential, that they killed all who came near them. Hence Cicero, in lib. i. De Divin. Quid enim ? Non videmus, quam sint varia terrarum genera } Ex quibus et mortifera quaedam pars est, ut et Amsancti in Hii*- pinis, et in Asia Plutonia.”
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CHAP. II.
But we sometimes see that take place which is now proposed to be considered. For it happens that spirits are commanded [to do this or that] who do not use a reason of their own, and have not the principle of judgment. Nor does this occur irrationally. For our dianoia naturally possessing the power of reasoning about and judging of things as they are, and comprehending in itself many powers of life, is accustomed to command the most irrational spirits, and such as derive their perfection from one energy alone. Hence, it invokes these as more excellent natures, because it endeavours to attract to particulars from the whole world, in which we are contained, things which con- tribute to wholes.* And it commands them as inferior natures, because frequently certain parts of things in the world [such as our reason- ing power] are more pure and perfect than things which extend themselves to the whole world. Thus, for instance, if one thing is in- tellectual [as is the case with our dianoia], but another is wholly inanimate or physical, then
, * And these irrational spirits, so far as they contribute to wholes, are more excellent than we are, though through be- ing irrational they are inferior to us.
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that which proceeds to a less extent has a more principal power than that which is more extended, though the former falls far short of the latter in magnitude and multitude of domi- nation. For these things, also, another reason may he assigned, and which is as follows : in all theurgical operations the priest sustains a twofold character ; one, indeed, as man, and which preserves the order possessed by our nature in the universe ; but the other, which is corroborated by divine signs, and through these is conjoined to more excellent natures, and is elevated to their order by an elegant circum- duction, this is deservedly capable of being surrounded with the external form of the Gods. Conformably, therefore, to a difference of this kind, the priest very properly invokes, as more excellent natures, the powers derived from the universe, so far as he who invokes is a man ; and again, he commands these powers, because through arcane symbols, he, in a certain respect, is invested with the sacred form of the Gods.
CHAP. III.
Dissolving, however, the doubts in a way still more true, we think it requisite, in invoking superior natures, to take away the evocations
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which appear to be directed to them as to men, and also the mandates in the performance of works, which are given with great earnestness. For if the communion of concordant friend- ship, and a certain indissoluble connexion of union, are the bonds of sacerdotal operations, in order that these operations may be truly divine, and may transcend every common action known to men, no human work will be adapted to them ; nor will the invocations of the priest resemble the manner in which we draw to ourselves things that are distant ; nor are his mandates directed as to things separated from him, in the way in which we transfer one thing from others. But the energy of divine fire shines forth voluntarily, and in common, and being self-invoked and self-energetic, energizes through all things with invariable sameness, both through the natures which impart, and those that are able to receive, its light. This mode of solution, therefore, is far superior, which does not suppose that divine works are effected through contrariety, or discrepance, in the way in which generated natures are usually produced ; but asserts that every such work is rightly accomplished through sameness, union, and consent. Hence, if we separate from each other that which invokes and that which is in- voked, that which commands and that which is
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commanded, that which is more and that which is less excellent, we shall, in a certain respect, transfer the contrariety of generations to the unbegotten goods of the Gods. But if we despise all such things, as it is just we should, as of an earth-born nature, and ascribe that which is common and simple, as being more honourable, to the powers who transcend the variety which is in the realms of generation, the first hypothe- sis of these questions will be immediately sub- verted, so that no reasonable doubt concerning them will be left.
CHAP. IV.
What then shall we say concerning the next inquiry to this, viz. “ why the powers who are invoked think it requisite that he who worships them should he just ^ hut they when called upon to act unjustly do not refuse so to act ? ” To this I reply, that I am dubious with respect to what you call acting justly, and am of opinion that what appears to us to be an accurate definition of justice does not also appear to be so to the Gods. For we, looking to that which is most brief, direct our attention to things present, and to this momentary life, and the manner in which it subsists. But the powers that are
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superior to us know the whole life of the soul, and all its former lives ; and, in consequence of this, if they inflict a certain punishment from the prayer of those that invoke them, they do not inflict it without justice, but looking to the offences committed by souls in former lives ; * which men not perceiving think that they unjustly fall into the calamities which they suffer.
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CHAP. Y.
The multitude, also, are accustomed to doubt in common the very same thing concerning providence, viz. why certain persons are afflicted undeservedly, as they have not done any thing unjustly prior to their being thus afflicted. For neither here is it possible to understand [perfectly] what the soul is, and its whole life, how many offences it has committed in former lives, and whether it now suffers from its former guilt. In this life, also, many unjust actions are concealed from human knowledge, but are known to the Gods, since neither is the same
* See the justice of providence in this respect most admir- ably defended by Plotinus, in the first of his treatises on Providence, which treatise forms one of the five books of Plotinus translated by me, in 8vo. 1794.
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scope of justice proposed to them as to men. For men, indeed, define justice to be the soul’s performance of its own proper business, and the distribution of desert, conformably to the established laws, and the prevailing polity. But the Gods, looking to the whole orderly arrangement of the world, and to the sub- serviency of souls to the Gods, form a judg- ment of what is just. Hence the judgment of just actions with the Gods is different from what it is with us. Nor is it wonderful, if we are unable, in most things, to arrive at the su- preme and most perfect judgment of more ex- cellent natures. What also hinders, but that to each thing by itself, and in conjunction with the whole alliance of souls, justice may in a very transcendent manner be decreed by the Gods? For if a communion of the same nature in souls, both when they are in and when they are out of bodies, produces a certain identical connexion and common order with the life of the world, it is likewise necessary that a fulfil- ment of justice should be required by wholes, and especially when the magnitude of the un- just deeds antecedently committed by one soul transcends the infliction of one' punish-
* In the original, rrjv tStav rrjs avToirpayLav, which
Gale very inadequately translates proprmm animce officmm.
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ment due to the offences. But if any one should add other definitions, through which he can show that what is just subsists with the Gods in a way different from that in which it is known by us, from these also our design will be facilitated. For me, however, the before- mentioned canons are alone sufficient for the purpose of manifesting the universal genus, and which comprehends every thing pertaining to the medicinal punishments inflicted by di- vine justice.
CHAP. VI.
In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend against the objec- tion which is now adduced, we will grant, if you please, the contrary to what we have asserted, viz. that certain unjust things are performed in this business of invocations. That the Gods, however, are not to be accused as the causes of these is immediately manifest. For those that are good are the causes of good ; and the Gods possess good essentially. They do nothing, therefore, that is unjust. Hence other causes of guilty deeds must be investi- gated. And if we are not able to discover these causes, it is not proper to throw away
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the true conception respecting the Gods, nor on account of the doubts whether these unjust deeds are performed, and how they are effected, to depart from notions concerning the Gods which are truly clear. For it is much better to acknowledge the insufficiency of our power to explain how unjust actions are perpetrated, than to admit any thing impossible and false respecting the Gods ; since all the Greeks and Barbarians truly opine the contrary to be the case with divine natures. After this manner, therefore, the truth respecting these particulars subsists.
CHAP. VII.
Moreover, it is necessary to add the causes whence evils* sometimes arise, and to show how many and of what kind they are. For the form of them is not simple ; but, being various, is the leader of the generation of various evils. For if what we a little before said, concerning images and evil daemons, who assume the ap- pearance of Gods and good daemons, is true, an abundant evil-producing tribe, about which a
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* See my translation of Proclus on the Subsistence of Evil, at the end of my translation of his six books on the Theology of Plato.
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contrariety of this kind usually happens, will from hence appear to flow. For an evil doemon requires that his worshipper should he just, be- cause he assumes the appearance of one belong- ing to the divine genus ; but he is subservient to ivhat is unjust, because he is depraved. The same thing, likewise, that is said of good and evil may he asserted of the true and the false. As, therefore, in divinations we attribute true predictions to the Gods alone, but when we detect any falsehood in predictions we refer this to another genus of cause, viz. that of dsemons ; thus, also, in things just and unjust, the beautiful and the just are to be alone ascribed to Gods and good daemons ; but such daemons as are naturally depraved, perpetrate what is unjust and base. And that, indeed, which consents and accords with itself, and always subsists with invariable sameness, per- tains to more excellent natures ; but that which is hostile to itself, which is discordant, and never the same, is the peculiarity in the most eminent degree of daemoniacal dissension, about which it is not at all wonderful that things of an opposing nature should subsist ; but perhaps the very contrary, that this should not be the case, would be more wonderful.
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CHAP. YIII.
AYe may, however, beginning from another liypothesis, demonstrate the same thing. We must admit that the corporeal parts of the universe are neither sluggish nor destitute of power, but as much as they excel our concerns in perfection, beauty, and magnitude, by so much also is the power which is present with them greater. Each, likewise, by itself is capa- ble of effecting different things, and produces certain different energies. They are also capa- ble of effecting things much more numerous on each other. And besides this, a certain multi- form production extends to parts from wholes; partly from sympathy, through similitude of powers, and partly from the aptitude of the agent to the patient. If, therefore, certain evils and destructions happen -to parts, they are salutary and good as with reference to wholes and the harmony of the universe, but to parts they introduce a necessary corruption, either from not being able to bear the energies of wholes, or from a certain other commixture and temperament of their own imbecility, or, in the third place, from the privation of symmetry in the parts to each other.
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CHAP. IX.
After the body of the universe, also, many things are generated by the nature of it. For the concord of similars, and the contrariety of dissimilars, effect not a few things. Farther still, the assemblage of many things into the one animal of the universe, and the powers in the world, whatever the number and quality of them may be, effect, in short, one thing in wholes and another in parts, on account of the divided imbecility of parts. Thus, for instance, the friendship, love, and contention which sub- sist in energy in the universe, become passions in the partial natures by which they are par- ticip>ated. Those things, likewise, that are preestablished in forms and pure reasons in the nature of wholes, participate of a certain material indigence, and privation of morphe, in things which subsist according to a part. And things which are conjoined to each other in wholes are separated in parts. Hence partible natures, which participate of wholes in con- junction with matter, degenerate from them in all things, and also from what is beautiful and perfect. But some parts are corrupted, in order that wholes may be preserved in a condition
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conformable to nature. Sometimes, likewise, parts are compressed and weighed down, though at the same time wholes, remain impassive to a molestation of this kind.
CHAP. X.
We shall collect, therefore, what happens from these conclusions. For if certain invocators employ the physical or corporeal powers* of the universe, an involuntary gift of energy [from these powers], and which is without vice, takes place. He, likewise, who uses this gift [sometimes] perverts it to things of a contrary nature, and to base purposes. And the gift, indeed, is moved contrarily together with the passions, and sympathetically through simili- tude ; but he who uses the thing which is im- parted, deliberately draws it, contrary to justice, to what is evil and base. And the gift, indeed, causes things which are most remote to co- operate through the one harmony of the world. But if some one understanding this to be the case should iniquitously endeavour to draw certain portions of the universe to other parts,
* See cap. 40, 41, 42, of Eunead iv. lib. iv. of Plotinus, from which the doctrine of this chapter is derived.
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these parts are not the cause of the evil that ensues ; but the audacity of men, and the transgression of the order in the world, pervert things that are beautiful and legal. Hence neither do the Gods effect what appears to be base, but this is accomplished by the natures and bodies that proceed from them ; nor do these very natures and bodies impart improbity from themselves, as it is thought they do ; hut they send their proper effluxions to places about the earth, for the salvation of wholes, and those who receive them transmute them by their commixture and perversion, and transfer what is given to a purpose different from that for which it was imparted. From all these par- ticulars, therefore, it is demonstrated that a - divine nature is not the cause of evils and un- just deeds.
CHAP. XI.
Moeeover, you inquire, and at the same time doubt, “ hoiv it comes to pass that the Gods do not hear him who invokes them, if he is impure from venereal connexions ; hut, at the same time, they do not refuse to lead any one to illegal venery” You have, indeed, a clear solution of these things from what has been before said ;
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if they are done contrary to [human] laws, but are effected according to another order and cause more excellent than laws. Or if it hap- pens that things of this kind are conformable to the mundane harmony and friendship, yet produce a conflict in parts through a certain sympathy. Or if the communication of good, which is beautifully imparted, is perverted by those that receive it to the conti*aiy.
CHAP. XII.
It is necessary, however, to discuss these things particularly, and to show how they sub- sist, and what reason they possess. It is requi- site, therefore, to understand that the universe is one animal ; and that the parts in it are, in- deed, separated by places, but through the possession of one nature hasten to each other.'* The whole collective power, however, and the cause of mixture, spontaneously draws the
* Agreeably to this, Plotinus, also, in Eunead iv. lib. iv. cap. 32, says, 7rav tovto to €v, Kai os ^wov ev* fcoov re 0VT09, Kai €69 ev TeA.owT09, ovSei/ ovroi Troppo) tottov
€6Va6 TT) TOV €V09 ^(tiOV 7T/)09 TO (TVpTradeiV
universe is one, and is as one animal. But being an animal and completely effecting one thing, nothing in it is so distant in place as not to be near to the nature of the one animal, on account of its sympathy with the whole of itself."
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parts to a mingling with each other. But it is also possible for this spontaneous attraction to be excited and extended by art more than is fit. The cause itself, therefore, of this mixture extending from itself to the whole world, is good, and the source of plenitude ; has the power of harmonically procuring communion, consent, and symmetry ; and inserts, by union, the indissoluble principle of love, which prin- ciple retains and preserves both things that are in existence, and such as are becoming to be. But in the parts, through their sepa- ration from each other and from wholes, and because, from their own proper nature, they are imperfect, indigent, and imbecile, their mutual connection is accompanied with pas- sion; by which, in most of them, desire and a connascent appetite are inherent. Art * there-
* This art is no other than magic, of which the following account, from a very rare Greek manuscript of Psellus, On Dcemons according to the Dogmas of the Greeks, will, I doubt not, be acceptable to the reader, as it illustrates what is here said by lamblichus, and shows that magic is not an empty name, but possesses a real power, though at present this art seems to be totally lost. Ficinus published some extracts from this manuscript in Latin ; but Gale does not appear to have had it in his possession. H yorjTeLa Se e TL rots CTTOTTrats ra tovtcov etScoAa. Kat tous pev (ocnrep aSov avayovcra, tovs 5e v\po6ev Karayovcra, Kac tovtovs Ka/cwTi- Kovs. Kai etSwAa arra (^avracrpara rots t(dv
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fore, perceiving this innate desire thus im- planted by nature, and distributed about it
TOVTWV. Kai T06S fi€V jOcv/xara Ttva CKeiOev KVfxaivovra eira- (jurja-L' Tois- Se Sea-fuov avea-ets Kai rpv(f>a yeAAcrat. eTrayerai Se ra eiracrfiaa-iv. t] Sc fiayeia 7roAvSwajU,ov T6 yj)ripa roi eSo^e. fiepiSa yovv eivai ravTrjv ^ouriv €cr)(aTrjv rrjs lepaTiKrjg iTTK^rjprjs. avi^yevovcra yap riov vtto rrjv creXrjvrjv xavTtov rrjv T€ ovo-av Kai Sc VTlt)V, Kai TCOV cvrevdev Kapiroiv, Xi6(x)v, /Soravdiv, Kai aTrAcos ecTTCiv, TTtti'TOs TTpaypaTO ^acriv re Kai Svvapiv. evrcv^ev a/aa ra €avrrj Tt/ca, Kai (T')(7]para Troicirai TravToSaira' Kai vocroiroia Sepi- ovpyrjpara erepa. Kai acTOi peVf Kai SpaKovres, fiuncripoi avroi KopaKe TCOV popidiv crvpTrXacreis TrapaXapfSavovrai, c^avTa^et Se ttoA- XaKi Tcov ayaXpara’ irvpl Sc avTopario XapTra8e i. e. “ Goeteia, or witchcraft, is a certain art respecting material and terrestrial daemons, whose images it causes to become visible to the spectators of this art. And some of these daemons it leads up, as it were from Hades, but others it draws down from on high ; and these, too, such as are of an evil species. This art, therefore, causes certain phan- tastic images to appear before the spectators. And before the eyes of some, indeed, it pours exuberant streams ; but to others it promises freedom from bonds, delicacies, and fa- vours. They draw down, too, powers of this kind by songs and incantations. But magic, according to the Greeks, is a thing of a very powerful nature. For they say that this forms the last part of the sacerdotal science. Magic, indeed, investigates the nature, power, and quality of every thing sublunary ; viz. of the elements, and their parts, of animals, all various plants and their fruits, of stones, and herbs : and
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(art itself also being multiformly distributed about nature), variously attracts and derives it as through a channel. Hence it transfers that which in itself is orderly and arranged into the privation of order, and fills that which is beau- tiful and commensurate with deformity. But the venerable end in each particular thing, which is connascent with union, it transfers to another indecorous plenitude, which is an
in short, it explores the essence and power of every thing. From hence, therefore, it produces its effects. And it forms statues which procure health, makes all various figures, and things which become the instruments of disease. It asserts, too, that eagles and dragons contribute to health ; but that cats, dogs, and crows are symbols of vigilance, to which, therefore, they contribute. But for the fashioning of certain parts wax and clay are used. Often, too, celestial fire is made to appear through magic ; and then statues laugh, and - lamps are spontaneously enkindled.”
This curious passage throws light on the following extract from the first book of the Metaphorsis of Apuleius : " Magico susurranime, amnes agiles reverti, mare pigrum coUigari, ventos inanimes expirare, solem inhiberi, lunam despumari, Stellas evelli, diem tolli, noctem teneri.” i. e. “ By magical incantation rapid rivers may be made to run back to their fountains, the sea be congealed, winds become destitute ot spirit, the sun be held back in his course, the moon be forced to scatter her foam, the stars be torn from their orbits, the day be taken away, and the night be detained.” For it may be inferred from Psellus, that witches formerly were able to cause the appearance of all this to take place. It must also be observed, that this MS. of Psellus On Dcemons forms no part of his treatise On the Energy of Dcemons, published by Gaulminus ; for it never was published.
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assemblage of different things according to a common passion. It likewise imparts a matter from itself, which is unadapted to the whole veneration of what is beautful, either because it does not entirely receive it, or because it transfers it to other things. It also mingles many different physical powers, which it ma- nages as it pleases for the purposes of genera- tion. Hence we have universally shown, that the apparatus of a venereal connexion of this kind proceeds from a certain human art, and not from a certain dsemoniacal or divine ne- cessity.
CHAP. XIII.
Consider, therefore, also another genus of causes ; how a stone or a herb frequently possess from themselves a nature corruptive, or again collective of generated natures. For this is not only the case with these, but this physical power is also in greater natures and greater things, which those who are not able to infer by a reasoning process, will perhaps transfer the works and energies of nature to more excellent beings \i. e. to Gods, angels, and dsemons]. Now, therefore, it is acknowledged that the tribe of evil daemons has a very extended
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power in generation, in human affairs, and in such things as subsist about the earth. Hence, why is it wonderful that a tribe of this kind should ejffect such works as these? For every man is not able to distinguish a good from an evil daemon, or by what peculiarities the one is separated from the other. Hence those, who are not able to perceive the difference between the two, absurdly reason concerning the cause of them, and refer this cause to genera superior to nature and the daemoniacal order. If, also, certain powers of a partial soul are assumed in order to effect these things, whether such a soul is detained in body, or has left the testaceous and terrestrial body, but wanders about the places of generation in a turbid and humid spirit; this, indeed, will be a true opinion, but separates the cause of these things at the greatest distance from more excellent natures. By no means, therefore, is that which is divine, or any good daemon, subservient to the illegal desires of men in venereal concerns. For of these things there are many other causes.
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