I. The Dogma in its Relation to Reason.

— The Hypostatic Union of the two natures in our Lord Jesus Christ is a theological mystery, and as such absolutely indemonstrable. But it is not, as the Rationalists allege, repugnant to reason.
a) A theological mystery is one the very ex- istence of which unaided human reason is un- able to discover, and which, to adopt the phrase- ology of the Vatican Council, by its own nature so far transcends the created intelligence that, even when delivered by Revelation and received by faith, it remains shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are wayfarers on this earth. ^
a) That the Hypostatic Union is a mystery in the above mentioned sense appears from the fact that, unlike the Blessed Trinity, it is not part of the inner divine being and life of the Godhead, but the result of a free decree. Whatever God has freely decreed to effectuate in time, can be perceived by no other medium than the manifestation of the divine Will itself, either as an actual fact {e. g., the Creation) or through supernatural revela-
1 Cone. Vatican., Sess. Ill, de Fide et Rat., can. i (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1816).
THE DOGMA AND REASON 117
tion (e. g., the end of the world). The whole question therefore comes to this, whether human reason can sub- sequently, that is, after the event, perceive the intrinsic possibilit)' of the Hypostatic Union or demonstrate it by stringent arguments. Fathers and theologians agree in answering this question in the negative. St- Cyril of Alexandria speaks of " the mystery of Christ " as some- thing so ineffably profound as to be altogether incompre- hensible.- Leo the Great confesses : " Utramque sub- stantiam in unam convenisse personam, nisi fides credat, sermo non explicat." ' Suarez is in perfect accord with St Thomas Aquinas,* in fact he voices the belief of all the Schoolmen when he says: "Non potest humand vel angelica cognitione naturali evidenter cognosci seu de- monstrari, incarnationem esse possibHem; est communis theologoriim." °
Whether the angels could by their natural powers conjecturally attain to a probable knowledge of the in- trinsic possibility of the Incarnation, is a question on which theologians differ. Some say no, while others* hold that the angelic intellect is sufficiently acute to per- ceive the abstract possibility of the H}T)ostatic Union. Cardinal De Lugo, who favors the last-mentioned view, readily admits, however, that any such knowledge on the part of an angel would needs be so largely mixed with doubt, as practically to amount to ignorance.'^
2 Contr, Nestor., I, 3 (Migne, Cardinal de Lugo (De MysU In- P. G., LXXVI, 112). cam., disp. 1, sect. 1).
3 Serm. in Nativ., 29, IX, i. Cfr. 7 De Lugo, De Myst. Incar., disp. Petavius, De Incarn., Ill, i. 1, sect. 1, n. 9: " De hoc tamen
4 Contr. Gent., IV, 27. mysterio angeltu propria lumine i De Incarn., disp. 3, sect. i. adeo parum cognosceret, ut merito 8 E. g., Gregory of Valentia (De dicaiur ipsvm laluisse atque idea
Incarn., disp. i, qu. i, ass. 2) and adinventionem fuisse ipsius Dei et
novum aliquid in terra creatum,"
Ii8 UNITY IN DUALITY
That human reason could not by itself have arrived at a probable knowledge of the intrinsic possibility of the Incarnation, is admitted by all theologians.
ft) Is there Scriptural warrant for the assertion that the Incarnation is a mystery in the strict sense of the term?
The Vatican Council seems to intimate that there is. In defining the dogma that there are absolute mysteries of faith, it quotes a text from St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians (i Cor. II, 7-9), which refers pri- marily to the Incarnation. The Apostle expressly speaks of " a wisdom which is hidden in a mystery,^ which none of the princes of this world knew," in contradis- tinction to that worldly wisdom which " the Greeks seek after." ^*> Now these two kinds of wisdom differ both with regard to their object and in principle. The wis- dom of God is the supernatural " spirit of Christ " which " spiritualizes " man, while the natural wisdom of " the disputer of this world " ^^ does not rise above the level of the " flesh." ^^ Accordingly, too, these different forms of wisdom must have specifically different sources. In matter of fact the " wisdom of the world " is derived from unaided human reason, while the " wisdom of God " has for its author the " Holy Spirit," who by means of external revelation and internal enlightenment unfolds to man " the deep things of God," ^^ and " re- veals " what " hath never entered into the heart [i. e. intellect] of man." ^* To exclude the notion that the " deep things " of which he speaks are hidden to men only as a matter of fact, but not in principle, the Apostle
8 Cfr. Lessius, De Perfect. Mori- 12 i Cor. II, 14 sqq.
busquc Divinis, XII, 5. 13 tA pdOy} rov Qeov, i Cor. II,
8 (TO lav if fiVffT7)pl
10 I Cor. I, 22. 14 I Cor. II, 9, 10.
11 1 Cor. I, 20.
THE DOGMA AND REASON 119
expressly declares that " the things that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God " who '* searcheth all things ; " ^^ in other words, the mysteries of the God- head completely transcend the powers of human under- standing. As we have already intimated, the Incarnation is a mystery primarily for this reason that it belongs to the free decrees of God which transcend human pres- cience.^* The Pauline texts we have just quoted vir- tually contain the further thought that the interior life of God, and in particular the existence of the Divine Logos, constitutes a supernatural mysterj' which not even the angelic intellect is able to fathom."
b) The human mind can no more understand the Hj^ostatic Union than it can fathom the Blessed Trinity; all attempts ever made in this direction have merely accentuated the absolute indemonstrability of the mystery.
It is true that nature offers certain analogies in the shape of substantial syntheses, which aid us to visualize and in a measure to understand the mystery once it is revealed. One such synthesis is, for example, the union of body and soul in man.^* But it needs only a super- ficial glance to convince us that there is no real parity between any natural s}Tithesis and the Hj'postatic Union- Whatever similarities may be noted are offset by nu-
15 I Cor. II, 10. take of the texts quoted above, con-
leCfr. Eph. I, 9; Col. I, 26 sq. suit Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat..
17 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Dizine Vol. IV, 3rd ed., pp. 39 sq., Frei-
Trinity, pp. 194 sqq.; Al. Schafer, burg 1909.
Erklarung der beiden Briefe an die 18 For other analogues see Les-
Korinther, pp. 51 sqq., Munster sius, De Perf. Moribusque Dimnis,
1903. On the peculiar view which XII, 5,
some few ex^etes have seen fit to
120 UNITY IN DUALITY
merous and important dissimilarities.^® Those who have spun out these analogies into full-fledged arguments have notoriously all ended in heresy. We need but in- stance Anton Giinther and his adherents Baltzer and Knoodt.^" The Christology of Giinther savors of Nesto- rianism, while his teaching on the Trinity is at bottom but a thinly veiled Tritheism.^^ Giinther's fundamental fallacy lies in his misconception of the term " person," which he wrongly defines as " a self-conscious substance." Since Christ possessed both a divine and a human con- sciousness, it was but natural for this nineteenth-century heretic to ascribe to Him two physical persons, which, he says, by virtue of a purely " dynamic and formal union " coalesce into a " Relationsperson." ^^ It was precisely in this that the heresy of Nestorius consisted — fusing hvo WoffTaacis into %v Trpoawirov, and conceiving the union of the two natures in Christ as a ei/wo-ts Kara axeatv.^^
c) Though human reason is unable to form an adequate notion of the nature of the Hypostatic Union, it finds no difficulty in refuting the objec- tions which various pseudo-philosophers have raised against the intrinsic possibility of the In- carnation.
a) Priding itself upon its natural powers, the human intellect from Celsus to Pierre Bayle** has contrived
18 Cfr, Janssens, De Deo-Homine, 28 For a fuller exposition and a
Vol. I, pp. 1 86 sqq. thorough refutation of Giinther's
20 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- system consult Kleutgen, Theologie chiridion, n. 1655. der Vorscit, Vol. Ill, and ed., pp.
21 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 60 sqq., Miinster 1870.
Trinity, pp. 256 sqq. 24 Cfr. the Dictionnaire Critique,
22 Giinther, Vorschule sur specu- s. v. " Pyrrhon." lativen Theologie, 2nd ed., Vol. II,
pp. 283 sqq., Wien 1848.
THE DOGMA AND REASON 121
many " arguments " to show that the Hypostatic Union is impossible and repugnant to right reason. But none of them hold water when subjected to careful scrutiny. For instance : Bayle asserts that if the Divine Logos sup- plied the human person in Christ, no man can be sure of his own personality. This conclusion is simply pre- posterous. Are all human beings so many Christs? Manifestly not. There is but one Christ.
/S) One of the most subtle objections against the dogma of the Incarnation is that advanced by Celsus, vis.: that a Hypostatic Union of Divinity with humanity would in- volve a change in the eternal Godhead. Let us briefly analyze the underlying fallacy of this specious contention.
The dogma of the Hypostatic Union embodies two separate and distinct truths: (i) The Logos began to be what He had not been before, namely, true man; (2) The Logos continued to be what He had been from all eternity, vis.: true God. Does this teaching involve a mutation?
To begin with, Celsus' objection strikes deeper than the Incarnation. It involves the general relationship of God to the universe, — Creation, Preservation, the Divine Con- cursus, and so forth. God created the world in time, without Himself undergoing a change from potentiality to actuality, for He is immutable. The difficulty is con- siderably enhanced in the case of the Incarnation, because of the permanent and intrinsic relation which the Logos bears to the manhood hypostatically assumed by Him. But the underlying principle is the same. A real change on the part of the Godhead would occur only in the Mono- physite hypothesis, viz.: if the two natures were sub- stantially combined, as such, into one nature; in other words, if the union of the two natures were not hy- postatic but merely a natural synthesis. This is not.
122 UNITY IN DUALITY
however, the meaning of the dogma, A Divine Hy- postasis must, even with respect of itself, be conceived as actually infinite in exactly the same manner in which the Divine Nature is infinite. Keeping this in mind, even the unaided human intellect may perceive that the " power of termination " possessed by a Divine Hypos- tasis must likewise be actually infinite, so much so that it may hypostatically terminate not only in its own Di- vine Nature, but in some created nature or variety of natures outside itself. Celsus' argument merely proves that the only possible kind of union between Godhead and manhood is the Hypostatic Union. But if this be so, is not the Incarnation altogether inconceivable? No, because the Divine Hypostases are possessed of an in- finite capacity in ipsa ratione hypostaseos.
On this basis the objection may be solved as follows: In the Incarnation of the Logos God was not drawn down to a mutable creature, but created manhood was elevated to the infinite Hypostasis of the immutable Logos. The change involved in this process conse- quently does not afifect the Ao'yos arpcTTTos,^^ but falls solely on Christ's hypostatically assumed humanity, which by this unutterable union was endowed with a superior dignity and received the stamp of divine conse- cration. In the words of St. Augustine, " Non im- mutavit homo Deum, sed sic assumptus est, ut com- mutaretur in melius et ab eo formaretur ineffahiliter excellentius." '^^
y) Another objection is indicated by the question: Did the Divine Logos experience an increase of intrinsic
26 On this term see Newman, Se- 26 This quotation is taken from
led Treatises of St, Athanasius, the great Doctor's work known as Vol. II, pp. 383 sq. LXXXIII Quaest., qu. 73.
THE DOGMA AND REASON 123
perfection by the hypostatic assumption of a created nature ?
The absurdity of this question becomes manifest when we recall the fact that the Logos, as a Divine Person, is the Bearer and Possessor of the Divine Nature, which is incapable of being perfected.-^ The Aoyo? evaapKos cannot be more perfect than the Aoyos acrapKo simple reason, among others, that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, by assuming human flesh, in no wise changed His identity. God remains the same unchangea- bly for ever. " Nihil illi contulit aut detraxit asstimpta pro nostra salute humana natura, quam ipse potius unitione sua glorificaznt. Neqne minor est Deus Verbiim Christo, quia ipse est Christus, neque seipso minor esse potest; et assiimptd came idem mansit Deus sine dubitatione per- fectus," writes Maxentius.^*
8) It is further objected that by assuming manhood the Logos must have experienced an increase of extrinsic perfection. This objection is similar to the Pantheistic one, which we have already refuted,^^ that God plus the universe must spell a higher measure of perfection than God minus the universe. Any and every attempt to add divine and creatural perfections must lead to nought The humanity of Christ and the Divinity of the Logos, if added together, no more result in a higher sum of perfection than the universe plus God. For every crea- tural perfection, no matter how exalted, is virtually and eminently contained in the perfection of God, and con- sequently cannot add one jot or tittle to it. Saint Thomas explains this as follows: "In persona com-
27Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 29 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: Hit Knowability, Essence, and Attri- Knowability, Essence, and Attri- butes, pp. 276 sqq. butes, i88 sqq,
28 DtoA coHtr. Nest., 1. II.
124 UNITY IN DUALITY
posita [i. e., Christo] quamvis sint plura bona quam in persona simplici [i. e., Verbo], quia est ibi bonum in- creatum et bonum creatum, tamen persona composita non est maius bonum quam simplex, quia bonum creatum se habet ad bonum increatum sicut punctum ad lineam, quum nulla sit proportio unius ad alterum. Unde sicut lineae additum punctum non facit maius, ita nee bonum creatum additum in persona bono increato facit melius" ^°
2. The Mutual Relationship of Nature AND Person. — In the Incarnation, as in the Blessed Trinity, the mystery of faith hinges upon the two fundamental notions of "Nature" and "Person," or "Nature" and "Hypostasis," be- causes a person is nothing else than a rational hy- postasis. For a full explanation of these terms we must refer the reader to our treatise on the Divine Trinity.^^
a) In that treatise we showed that the notion of " Hypostasis " (and, in the case of rational beings, also that of "Person"), besides " inseity " and "integ- rity" (substantia prima integra), includes, as its chief note, "perseity " (totietas in se), i. e., independent sub- sistence as a being distinct from all other beings. While the concept of "Nature" (substance, essence) corre- sponds to the question Whatf — that of "Hypostasis" (Person) corresponds to the question Whof The Fathers and various councils explain the mutual re-
80 Com. in Quatuor Libros Sent., thes. 33 ; G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol.,
Ill, dist. 6, qu. 2, art. 3, ad i. Vol. Ill, pp. 554 sqq., Paris 1896;
For a more detailed refutation of Billuart, De Incarnationc, disp. i,
these objections consult De Lugo, art. i-a.
De Mysterio Incarn., disp. u, sect. 81 Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trin-
7; Franzelin, De Verbo Incarnato, ity, pp. 220 sqq.
NATURE AND PERSON 125
lation of these two notions by saying that where several natures and persons are involved, the persons must be conceived as alius et alius, the natures as aliud et aliud. Thus in the ^Nlost Holy Trinity, tlie Father and the Son are alius et alius, but not aliud et aliud, because, though distinct as Persons, they are absolutely identical in Nature. In Christ, on the other hand, because of His twofold nature, we may distinguish aJiud et aliud, but not alius et alius, because He is only one Person. As St. John Damascene^- aptly observes, "Hypostasis non significat quid vel quale aliquid est, sed quis est. . . . Oportet vera scire quod, quae naturd differunt, aliud et aliud dicuntur, quae autem distinguuntur numero, rid. hypostases, dicun- tur alius et alius. . . . Natura signiUcai quid aliquid sit, hypostasis vero hunc aliquem ^^ vel hoc aliquid." '*
Two conclusions flow from the explanation which we have given: (i) The heretical principle underlying Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and the heresy of Giin- ther, namely that " There are as many Hypostases (Per- sons) as there are natures," must be false from the philosophical no less than from the theological stand- point ; (2) It is not sufficient, either in philosophy or the- ology, to draw a purely logical distinction ^^ between na- ture and person.
b) In the Blessed Trinity there is at least a virtual distinction ^^ between person and nature. In man some hold the distinction may even be real.^' There are two opposing theories in re- gard to this point.
32 Dial., c 17. Z9 Dijfifei^:;r1Bio€^ frntipciniil^e
33T«|.d. *. cui^^iu^^q^h, fntJ.''jQ/> \
z*t65€ Ti. azD^^io realu. *^* '\
35 Diitinctio rationis ratiocinantis. ^ r-'fSr«/^>'''^rS J
\4/0r?;\r,'^^>^'"
126 UNITY IN DUALITY
a) One of them originated in the sixteenth century, and counts among its adherents such eminent theologians and philosophers as Suarez, Vasquez, De Lugo, Arriaga, and, more recently, Schiffini, Tepe, von der Aa, Fr. Schmid, and Urraburu. These writers maintain that no individual human nature of and by itself possesses per- sonality, i. e.j independent subsistence, but there must be superadded to the concrete human nature a peculiar kind of reality in order to constitute it a human person. Thus, for instance, " this particular man " becomes a hu- man person only by the addition of a reality which we may call " being-Peter." In this hypothesis personality is a metaphysical entity separable from nature. But how are we to conceive of that peculiar entity by which a concrete nature is elevated to the rank of an independent personality? On this point the advocates of the theory differ. Peter Hurtado^* and Quiros ventured the ab- surd suggestion that personality is a real substance which nature can put on or off like a hat, and which conse- quently can exist (supported by divine omnipotence) apart from nature. Other divines hold personality to be a " modal reality," ^^ which admits of a one-sided but not of a mutual separation between nature and person. " Per potentiam Dei ahsolutam sine implicatione posset natura singularis conservari absque ulla personalitate," says Gregory of Valentia.*" These writers base their chief argument upon the consideration that without some such modal reality, detachable from nature, the dogma that Christ's manhood is a perfect human nature but no hu- man person, would be unintelligible. They hold that in becoming man the Logos assumed an impersonal human-
88 Metaph., disp. 2, sect. 9, n. 50. 40 De Incarn., disp. i, qu. 4, p.
80 Modus realis, substantialis, sup- 2, opin. 8, obi. 3. positalis, forma kypostatica.
NATURE AND PERSON 127
ity — impersonal because devoid of " hypostatic reality " — and communicated to it His own Divine Personality. Thus that which was awrroaraTov became cwTroaraTov.*^
p) A second and more plausible theory is that of Scotus and his school, adopted by Molina, Petavius, An- toine, A. Mayr, Tiphanus, and more recently by Franze- lin, Stentrup, Chr. Pesch, and others. These authors hold that the distinction between nature and person in man is not real but virtual, the same concrete object being in one respect nature, and in another, hypostasis or person. The advocates of this theory do not, or at least need not deny that personality in human nature is a real and positive mode, and consequently not a mere negation, as is erroneously held by the Scotists. They merely deny that this positive mode is really dis- tinct and separable from concrete nature. That men are in the habit of circumscribing personality by negative terms (such as, e. g., incommunicability) does not prove that tlie objective concept of personality is purely nega- tive ; just as little as " unity " is a negative concept be- cause we define it as " indivision."
This theory, which is probably the true one, was orig- inally propounded by Theodore Abucara in the eighth century. " Aliudtte," he queries, "est substantia [i. e., natura] alindne hypostasis? Orthodoxus: Aliud et aliud non tamquam res alia et alia, sed quod aliud si- gnificat hypostasis et aliud substantia,*^ sicut granum tritici dicitur et est turn semen turn fructus, non tam- quam res alia et alia, sed aliud signiUcat semen et aliud fructus." *' In its application to Christology this theory
41 We are not, as was once gen- Lconiius von Bysans, pp. 148 sqq.,
erally supposed, indebted for this Paderbom 1908.
terminology to Leontius of Byzan- 42 Note the virtual distinctioti.
titiin (d. about 543) ; it dates back 43 Opusc, 28. to the third centtiry, Cfr. Junglas,
128 UNITY IN DUALITY
consistently explains the absence of a human person in Christ, not by subtraction, i. e., by the removal of a real and separable mode of subsistence, but by sim- ply adding human nature (without personality) to the su- perior Hypostasis of the Logos. Because of its impor- tance we shall have to explain this a little more fully.
c) Abstractly, the mutual relationship between Christ's Divinity and His humanity may be con- ceived in a fourfold manner. ( i ) Either, person is so united with person that the result is merely one "moral person." This is the error of Nes- torius. (2) Or, nature is blended with nature so as to produce a third being intermediate be- tween the two. This is Monophysitism. (3) Or, the human personality, suppressing the Di- vine Hypostasis of the Logos, is united with the Divine Nature in such wise as to cause Godhead and manhood to subsist in one purely human hypostasis. This heresy is so preposterous that it has never found a defender. (4) Or, lastly, the Divine Person of the Logos, superseding and displacing the human person of Christ, unites it- self with His human nature alone. This is the Catholic dogma of the Hypostatic Union.
Why is it that the human nature of Christ, which is like unto ours in everything except sin, is not a human person, but receives its person- ation from the Logos? This speculative ques- tion may be answered as follows :
NATURE AND PERSON 129
a.) The distinction between nature and person in man being merely virtual, Christ's humanity loses its connatural personality by being assumed into and absorbed by the Divine Logos.
In becoming the property and possession of the Per- son of the Logos, the manhood of Jesus Christ, by virtue of the Hypostatic Union, loses its perseitas, i. e., its independent existence. Though remaining a substantia prima et integra (i. e., a nature), it is no longer a sub- stantia tota in se (t. e., an hypostasis), for the reason that it has become a quasi-constitutive element of a higher hypostasis. Tiphanus," Franzelin,*^ and Chr. Pesch*® base this explanation on sundry Patristic texts. But these texts either accentuate the complete consub- stantiality of Christ with man,*'^ or lay stress on the Christological axiom : " Qtiod assumptum non est, non est sanatum," ** and therefore are not to the point, be- cause the opponents of the pecuHar theory we are here considering do not assert that " hypostatic reality " forms a part of human nature; they merely define it as a per- sonifying modus substantialis, which by its inmost nature is incapable of being assumed into the Divine Hypos- tasis of the Logos.*^ A more effective argument for this theory can be drawn from the fact that it had three very ancient defenders in Rusticus Diaconus,^" Theodore Abucara,^^ and St. Maximus Confessor, and that the
44 De Hypostasi et Persona, c. 29. Three Chapters was a deacon of
iaDe Verho Incarnato, thes. 31. the Roman Church and a nephew
46 Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. IV, pp. of Pope Vigilius. He flourished 55 sqq. about the year 550.
47 V. supra, p. 39 sqq. 51 On Theodore Abucara, who
48 V. Soteriology. was a contemporary of St. John Da-
49 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. mascene, cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator III, pp. 498 sqq. Literarius Theol. CathoL. Vol. I,
50 This stubborn defender of the ed. 3a, col. 647 sq.
130 UNITY IN DUALITY
opposite doctrine, as one of its chief defenders admits, is a comparatively modern invention.^^
Theodore Abucara clearly teaches : " Non satis est compositam esse naturam cum proprietatibus ad genera- tionem hypostasis, sed oportet concurrere ad hoc et non esse partem; quia igitur pars Christi est assumptum corpus animatum [i. e., humana natura], idcirco non est hypostasis, sed hypostaticum." ^^
As regards the later Scholastics, they unanimously maintain that the humanity of Christ would promptly reassume the character of a human person if, and as soon as, it were released from the Hypostatic Union.^* Not one of them intimates that in this fictitious hy- pothesis the human nature would require a special and real form of subsistence in order to enable it to become a human person after its elimination from the Logos.
P) The attitude of St. Thomas in this matter is rather uncertain. Both parties to the dispute, i. e., those who assume a real and those who assert a purely virtual dis- tinction between nature and person, appeal with equal confidence to his great authority.
St. Thomas held with Peter Lombard and his master Albertus Magnus that " Separatio dat utrique partium totalitatem et in continuis dat etiam utrique esse in actu.
62 ". . . scholastica disputatione dcponeret erit substantia rationalis
non multis abhinc annis adinventum naturae individua, ergo erit persona,
est." P. Vasquez, S. J., De In- Si autetn quaeratur, quid confer at
earn,, disp. 41, c. 4. ei personalitatem quam prius non
58 Opusc, 28 (Migne, P. G., habuit, dicendum quod singularitas
XCVII, 1578). quam prius non habuit sive in-
04 This is admittedly the teaching communicabilitas, ut alii dicunt;
of Peter Lombard, Hugh and Rich- nam proprie singularitas facit per-
ard of St. Victor, Alexander of sonam in rationali natura," {Com.
Hales, Albertus Magnus, and of in Qualuor Libros Scntcntiarum,
Scotus and his school. "Si Chri- III, dist. s, art. 12). Other refer-
stus deponeret humanitatem," says ences in Tiphanus, De Hypostasi et
(. g. Albert the Great, " id quod Persona, c. 6.
NATURE AND PERSON 131
Unde supposito quod [Verbum] hotninem deponeret, subsisteret homo tile per se in natura rationali et ex hoc ipso acciperet rationem personae" ^^ He further- more lays it down as an axiom that Christ's manhood has no human personality, not on account of some in- herent defect, but in consequence of having superadded to it something which transcends human nature.^* In those passages of his writings where he speaks of the " destruction of personality " in Christ,*^ St. Thomas seems to employ the term " destruction " in a meta- phorical, not in its strict and literal sense. Thus he argues against the proposition : " Persona Dei con- sumpsit personam hominis," which was falsely attributed to Pope Innocent III : *** " Consumptio ibi non importat destructionem alicuius quod prius fuerat, sed impedi- tionetn eius quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a diiAna persona, natura hu- mana propriam personalitatem haberet; et pro tanto dicitur persofui ' consumpsisse' personam, licet im- proprie, quia persona diznna sua unione impediiAt, ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet," *"
d) It may be objected that Christ's sacred humanity would not be perfect if it lacked the su- es Comment, in Quatuor Libros Reji, one of the most influential Sent., Ill, djst. 5, qu. 3, art. 3. bishops of Southern Gaul between 56 Cfr. S. Theol., 3a, qu. 4, art. 450 and 500. The passage occurs 2, ad 2: "Naturae assumptae n»n in his work De Spiritu Sancto, II, deest propria personalitas propter 4. On Faustus of Reji and his defectum alicuius quod ad perfec- teaching cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, tionem humanae naturae pertineat, Patrology, pp. 600 sqq. sed propter additionem alicuius quod 59 S. Theol., 3a, qu. 4, art. 2, ad est supra humanam naturam, quod 3. For further information on this est unio ad diz-inam personam." subtle problem see Franzelin, De Additional texts apud Franzelin, D* Verba Incarnato, thes. 31, Coroll. 1. Verba Incarnato, thes. 30. L. Janssens (De Deo-Homine, I: 67 See the references in Tepe's Christologia, pp. 626 sqq.) puts his Instit. Theol., Vol. Ill, pp. 481 sqq. own construction upon the teaching es Its real author was Faustus of of the Angelic Doctor.
132 UNITY IN DUALITY
preme prerogative of personality. But this objec- tion is beside the point. Christ's human nature is a person through the divine personahty of the Lo- gos, and it is a far higher prerogative for a cre- ated nature to subsist in a Divine Person than in its own personahty. "Natura assumpta in Christo eo ipso est nohilior," says St. Bonaven- ture, "quod in nobiliori persona stabilitur; unde ordinatio ad dignius, quamvis auferat rationem suppositionis [i. e., hypostaseos propriae], non tamen aufert dignitatis proprietatem." ^^
3. Why the Incarnation of the Logos Does Not Involve the Incarnation of the Whole Trinity. — As there is but a virtual dis- tinction between each Divine Hypostasis and the Divine Essence/^ and the latter is therefore iden- tical with the Father and the Holy Ghost in pre- cisely the same sense in which it is identical with the Son, it might seem that the Incarnation of the Son necessarily involves the Incarnation of the Father and the Holy Ghost. The subjoined ob- servations will serve to remove this difficulty.
a) It is an article of faith that the substantial and physical union of Godhead and manhood in Christ is strictly hypostatic, i. e., the Godhead is not united with the manhood immediately and formally, as nature with nature, but only in a mediate and indirect manner
•0 Comment, in Quatuor Libros qu. a, Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., Sententiarum, III, dist. 5, art. 2, 3a, qu. 2, art. 2.
61 V. supra, p. 125.
INCARNATION AND THE TRINITY 133
through the Person of the Logos. Rusticus Diaconus expresses it thus: " Non Deus Verhum per dkinam naturam, sed divina natitra per Dei Verbi personam unita dicitur carni" ^^ If the relation were reversed, that is to say, if the manhood of Christ were formally united with the nature of the Logos and not with His Person, there would result an impossible commingling of both natures or an equally impossible transformation of the one into the other. If, therefore, considering the ter- minus of the Incarnation, we ask : " Which of the Three Divine Persons became man ? " the answer is : " Neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost, but solely the Son of God or Logos." John I, 14: " Et Verbum caro factum est — And the Word was made flesh." The only here- tics who ever denied this dogma were the Sabellians and Patripassianists. All the official creeds and the older ecumenical councils unanimously inculcate it.^^
Durandus holds that the union of Christ's manhood with the Divine Logos was effected primarily by an abso- lute attribute common to all three Divine Persons, namely, the absolute self -existence of the Trinity, and only secondarily by the personality of the Logos as such.^* This theory is out of joint with the dogmatic teaching of the Church. Were it true, the Incarnation would be primarily an Incarnation of the whole Trinity, and only secondarily of the Son. The Sixth Council of Toledo (A. D. 675) implicitly condemned this view when it defined : " Incarnationem quoque huius Filii
62 Contr. Acephal. naturae divinae secundum seipsam,
63 Cfr. St. Thomas, 5'. Theol., 3a, sed ratione personae, in qua consi- qu. 3, art. 2: "Esse assumptionis deratur: et idea primo quidem et principium convenit naturae divinae propriissime persona dicitur osak- secunditm seipsam, quia eius virtuie mere."
assumptio facta est; sed esse ter- 64 Comment, in Quatuor Libras
minum assumptionis non convenit Sent., Ill, dist. i, qu. 5, n. 10.
134 UNITY IN DUALITY
Dei tota Trinitas operasse [scil. operata esse] credenda est [scil. efficienter], quia inseparabilia sunt opera Tri- nitatis [^ad extra]. Solus tamen Filius formam servi ac- cepit in singularitate personae [i. e., terminative], non in unitate divinae naturae, in id quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune Trinitati." ®^
b) Regarded actively, i. e., as an external operation of Grod (opus ad extra), the Incarnation, though spe- cially appropriated to the Holy Ghost,**^ must have for its efficient cause the entire Trinity or the Divine Es- sence as such. The Three Divine Persons conjointly created the manhood of Christ, they preserve it in its being and operation, and concur with all its creatural actions. As the Incarnate Word is immanent in the Father and the Holy Ghost by virtue of the Trinitarian Perichoresis,®'^ so the Father and the Holy Ghost are in Christ by virtue of the Hypostatic Union. This presence transcends the mode by which the omnipresent God is in all His creatures, and is also superior to the manner of His indwelling in the souls of the just. It is a very special kind of immanence.^* Cfr. John X, 30 sqq. : "Ego et Pater unum sumus. . . . Pater in me est et ego in Patre — I and the Father are one . . . the Father is in me, and I in the Father." John XIV, 9 sq. : '' Qui videt me, videt et Patrem. . . . Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est? — He that seeth me seeth the Father also. . . . Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me ? " °^
6B Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- 67 For an explanation of the
dion, n. 284. Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Trinitarian Pcrichoresis cfr. Pohle-
Theol., Vol. Ill, pp. 524 sqq.; Bil- Prcuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 281
luart, De Incarn,, diss. 6, art, 2. sqq.
66 " Conceptus de Spiritu Sancto." 68 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine
(On the Divine Appropriations see Trinity, pp. 281 sqq.
Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, 69 The rather obscure passage of
pp. 244 sqq.) St. Cyril of Alexandria (In loa..
INCARNATION AND THE TRINITY 135
c) In this connection theologians are wont to discuss another speculative problem, namely, whether or not the Father or the Holy Ghost might have become man in- stead of the Son. St. Anselm appears to deny the pos- sibility of such an event, for this reason, among others, that the Incarnation of either one of the other two Per- sons would lead to inextricable confusion in the use of the name " Son." His argument substantially is that, had the Father become man. He would have been con- strained to appear as " filius hominis," which would have been repugnant to His personal character as Father."® And the same is true of the Holy Ghost. The School- men preferred to adopt the view of St. Thomas, who says that the Father and the Holy Ghost could have be- come incarnate as well as the Son, and solves the above- quoted objection as follows: " Fiiiatio temporalis, qua Christ us dicitur Ulius hominis, non constituit personam ipsius sicut fiiiatio aeterna, sed est quiddam consequens natiintatem temporalem: unde si per hunc modum nomen aiiationis ad Patretn vel Spiritum Sanctum transferretur, nulla sequeretur confusio personarum." '^
The problem assumes a more complicated aspect if for-- mulated thus : Could the Three Divine Persons together become incarnate in one human nature, in such wise that this human nature would be a three-fold Divine Person, z'is.: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?
The question here is not whether the Three Divine Hy- postases could become so united in one human nature as to
XI) : " carnem absque confusione sis. For a more elaborate treatment
venisse in unionem cum Verba et of this subject see Franzelin, De
per ipsum cum Patre, relative vi- Verba Incarnato, ties. 32.
delicet, non physice ixal Si' avTov lO De Fide Trinit. et de Incarn.
■Kphi TOP -raripa, ax^''''-'^'^^ SffKovre Verbi, 1. IV.
Ktti oi) vatKbn)," must be inter- li Summa Theol., 3a, qti. 3, art.
preted as referring to the Perichore- 5, ad i.
136 UNITY IN DUALITY
constitute but one Divine Person. This would entail the Sabellian absurdity that " the Father is the Son." ^^ What we wish to ascertain is whether the Three Divine Per- sons could assume one and the same human nature as three separate and distinct Hypostases. St. Bonaventure thinks that this hypothesis could be " reasonably de- fended." ''^ Not so the later Scotists, who held that the question, thus formulated, involves an intrinsic contra- diction. St. Thomas solved the problem on the principle that, " as the Three Divine Persons can without contra- diction subsist in one Divine Nature, so they can also subsist in one human nature." '^^
Another still more difficult problem is: Could the Divine Logos either simultaneously or successively as- sume one or more human natures in addition to the one He already possesses? In other words: Could the Logos become incarnate repeatedly, say, for instance, on different planets? In view of what we have said " about the infinite range of a Divine Hypostasis, we are con- strained to answer this question in the affirmative. To assert that a Divine Person can assume only one human nature, would be equivalent to denying God's omnipotence and infinity. Therefore the Scholastics teach with St. Thomas: " Potentia divinae personae est iniinita, ncc potest limitari ad aliquid creatum. Unde non est dicen-
72 " Plures personas assumere mana, ita scil. quod sit una nature
unam eandemque naturam [in una humana a tribns pcrsonis assumpta."
persona] nee est possibile nee est Whence it follows: "Est autem
intelligibile," says St. Bonaventure talis divinarum personarum condi-
{Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., tio, quod una earum non exeludit
III, dist. I, qu. 3, art. 1). aliam a communione eiusdem na-
78 Cfr. L. Janssens, De Deo- furac, sed solum a communione
Hotnine, I, pp. 230 sqq. eiusdem personae. . . . Sie ergo non
745. Theol., 3a, qu. 3, art. 6: est impossibile divinis personis, ut
" Tres personae possunt subsistere duae vel Ires assumant wnam /»«•
in una natura divina; ergo etiam manam naturam."
possunt subsistere in una natura hu- 7B Supra, pp. 121 sq.
CHRIST'S "DOUBLE EXISTENCE" 137
dum quod persona divina it a assumpserit unant naturam humanam, tit non potiierit ysimiil] assiimere aliam. Videretur enim ex hoc seqiti quod personalitas divinae naturae esset ita comprehensa per unam naturam hu- manam, quod ad eius personalitatem alia assumi non possit, quod est impossibile.
. " 76
4. The Controversy Regarding the *'Dou- BLE Existence" of Christ. — This controversy hinges on the question whether the distinction between an individual substance (or nature) and its existence is real or only logical.
a) Not a few eminent philosophers and theologians hold that the distinction is purely logical, because " re- ality " and " existence " are merely different terms for the same thing. The Thomists maintain that there is a real distinction. Between the two states designated as " possibility " and *' existence," they say, we can conceive a third which is intermediate and may be called " ac- tuality," inasmuch as a possible being transferred from the state of mere possibility to that of actuality is not yet existent, but requires the accession of the actus existendi, — a separable entity by which a thing re- ceives its " formal existence." To illustrate the theory by an example: Peter, who is a creature, does not re- ceive his existence through the fact that he is created, i. e., a creature, but by virtue of a supervening forma existen- tiae. It is one of the fundamental axioms of the Thomist school that there are in every creature three really dis-
76 S". TheoL, 3a, qu. 3, art. 7. eventuality cfr. De Lugo, De Myst.
Cfr. L. Janssens, De Deo-Homine, Incarn., disp. 13, sect. 3; on the
I, pp. 221 sqq. On the mode of whole subject, Billuart, De Incarn.,
predication appropriate to such an diss. 6, art. 4.
138 UNITY IN DUALITY
tinct stages of being, to wit : ( i ) Esse essentiae or phys- ical essence, (2) esse subsistentiae or hypostasis, and (3) esse existentiae or existence, each of which flows succes- sively from the other by way of emanation.
This peculiar theory has given rise to the question: Is there but one existence in Christ, i. e., that of the Divine Logos ? or are there two existences, a divine and a human? Cardinal Cajetan, Capreolus, Medina, Billuart, Gonet, and other Thomists maintain that the sacred hu- manity of Christ, being deprived of its connatural exist- ence as a human person, derives its existence solely from the Divine Logos, who displaces and supplies the created existence of manhood by His Divine Existence in the same manner in which He displaces and supplies the missing human personality by His Divine Person.'^ This view has been adopted by some able theologians who are not otherwise adherents of the Thomist system {e. g., the Jesuits Billot and Terrien), and it deserves to be treated with respect, because it is apt to create a sublime conception of the Hypostatic Union.'^®
For those who hold that concrete reality and existence are objectively identical, the question is, of course, mean- ingless. If a thing exists by the very fact of its being concretely actual, it is metaphysically impossible to as- sume that the sacred humanity of Christ is deprived of its
77 Cfr. Gonet, disp. 8, art. 2, n. humanitas optime servalur, dum 33: " Dico Verhum non solum sub- ipse Christus et in persona et in sistentiam, sed etiam existentiam in exist entia it a pure divinus illustra' humanitate Christi supplere, subin- tur, ut omnes cius actiones atque deque illam non per existentiam operae divinum incarnationis my- creatam et sibi propriam, sed dum- sterium probent, quo humana natura taxat per divinam et increatam exi- perfects perfecte quoque Dei facta stere." atque intime deificata videatur, quod
78 E. Commer speaks of it thus: solum Christum servatorem adoran- " Vere profunda doctrina et mi- dum decet." (De lesu Puero Nato, randa, quia vera et propria Christi p. 10, Vindobonae 1901.)
CHRIST'S " DOUBLE EXISTENCE " 139
proper creatural existence, and that this is supplied by the uncreated existence of the LogosJ"
b) But there is involved in this debate a the- ological problem which would remain unsolved even were we to admit the Thomistic view that in Christ, qua man, existence and reality differ really and objectively. This theological question is, whether or not the sacred manhood of our Lord is de facto deprived of its human existence and exists solely by virtue of the divine existence proper to the Logos. Gregory of Valentia, Tole- tus, Suarez, V^asquez, Tanner, Franzelin, Sten- trup, Chr. Pesch, Tepe, and most theologians of the Scotist persuasion hold that it can be shown on strictly theological grounds that the sacred hu- manity of Christ in the Hypostatic Union does not exist per existentiam divinam, but retains its proper human existence. They argue as follows :
a) It has been defined by various councils that, apart from a human personality, the sacred humanity of Christ
79 The underlying metaphysical cirelli, De Distinctione inter Actu-
problem is more fully discussed by atam Essentiam Exist entiamque En-